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Waging War, Deciding Guilt:
Trying the Military Tribunals
Neal K. Katyall and Laurence H. Tribet
A time of terror may not be the ideal moment to trifle with the most
time-tested postulates of government under law. It is certainly not a good
time to dispense lightly with bedrock principles of our constitutional
system. Central among those principles is that great power must be held in
check and that the body that defines what conduct to outlaw, the body that
prosecutes violators, and the body that adjudicates guilt and dispenses
punishment should be three distinct entities. To fuse those three functions
under one man's ultimate rule, and to administer the resulting simulacrum
of justice in a system of tribunals created by that very same authority, is to
mock the very notion of constitutionalism and to make light of any
aspiration to live by the rule of law.'
In a time of declared war, or in a place where no other form of justice
can be administered, institutional arrangements resembling that sketched
above, reposing this extraordinary mix of powers in the President as
Commander in Chief, might be tolerable. Short of such extreme
circumstances, the Constitution at least requires, at a bare minimum, that
offenses be defined in advance by positive legislation, that the judicial
branch be open to test whether any given individual is properly subject to
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1. Ours is "a government of laws and not of men." MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, art. XXX;
see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) ("The government of the United
States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men.").
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the jurisdiction of the tribunals at issue and whether the system of tribunals
as a whole comports with constitutional commands, and that appeal to some
body independent of the President as the convening and prosecuting
authority be available to test whether any conviction and sentence handed
down by one of the President's tribunals is supportable in law on the
evidence presented.
The Constitution requires as well that, absent circumstances so exigent
as demonstrably to rule out resort to Congress, that lawmaking body and
not the Commander in Chief be the authorizing agent and the architect of
the tribunals themselves. For the President to proceed on his own to alter
the jurisdiction of the federal courts, redesigning the very architecture of
justice, without any colorable claim that time is too short for Congress to
act, is to succumb to an executive unilateralism all too familiar in recent
days. As of this writing, to take a few examples, the President has evidently
decided on his own that those detained at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, are
unlawful belligerents not entitled to prisoner-of-war status; he has
suspended one of the oldest privileges in Anglo-American jurisprudence,
the attorney-client privilege, for certain suspects; he has detained over a
thousand people without ever publicly identifying all those who have been
detained; and he has convinced American news networks not to carry full
broadcasts of Osama bin Laden because the broadcasts may carry hidden
messages.'
While some of these decisions are undoubtedly justified, in the pages
that follow we show that the President's Order establishing military
tribunals for the trial of terrorists is flatly unconstitutional. We argue that
military tribunals are not necessarily unconstitutional under all
circumstances; we examine and apply the relevant judicial precedents
bearing on when such tribunals may properly be used; and we identify a
few open questions that we think merit further consideration.
I. THE MILITARY ORDER
Without advance notice to either the congressional leadership or the
public, President Bush issued a Military Order on November 13, 2001,
which directed the Secretary of Defense to create military tribunals and to
take into custody at once anyone the President names as subject to the
2. See Bruce Ackerman, Don't Panic, LONDON REV. BOOKS, Feb. 7, 2002, at 15 (describing
many of these examples); William Safire, Editorial, Colin Powell Dissents, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28,
2002, at A15 (describing State Department opposition to the decision on detainee status);
Katharine Q. Seelye, Detainees Are Not P.O.W.'s Cheney and Rumsfeld Declare, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 28, 2002, at A6 (describing how the Bush Administration has decided to treat those detained
at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, as unlawful combatants).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
1260 [Vol. 111: 1259
Military Tribunals
Order.3 The range of people eligible to be so named is vast-potentially
jeopardizing the rights and liberties of the approximately 20 million aliens
in the United States, as well as any non-United States citizen anywhere in
the world. The only cognizable standard for the tribunals' jurisdiction is
appreciably toothless: All it takes is the President's unilateral written
statement that he has "reason to believe" either that a particular noncitizen
has at some point committed, or aided and abetted, what the President
deems an act of "international terrorism," or that a person is, or at any
point was, a member of a named terrorist organization (al Qaeda).4 The
Order's terms sweep so broadly that they reach a Basque separatist who
kills an American citizen in Madrid, or a member of the Irish Republican
Army who threatens the American embassy in London.5
The Order explicitly permits the tribunals to "sit at any time and any
place"-including the United States.6  While the Military Order's
procedural protections fall conspicuously short of those most Americans
take for granted,7 the Secretary of Defense is authorized to provide further
protections through regulation.8 Such regulations are necessary to cure
3. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism
§§ 3(a), 4(b), 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001) [hereinafter Military Order].
4. The Order covers anyone who there is reason to believe
(i) is or was a member of the organization known as al Qaida;
(ii) has engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of international
terrorism, or acts in preparation therefor, that have caused, threaten to cause, or have as
their aim to cause, injury to or adverse effects on the United States, its citizens, national
security, foreign policy, or economy; or
(iii) has knowingly harbored one or more individuals described [in the first two
categories above].
Id. § 2(a)(t) (emphasis added).
5. Id. As the White House Counsel wrote, "Under the order, the president will refer to
military commissions ... noncitizens who are members or active supporters of Al Qaeda or other
international terrorist organizations targeting the United States." Alberto R. Gonzales, Editorial,
Martial Justice, Full and Fair, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2001, at A27.
6. Military Order, supra note 3, § 4(c)(1); see also id. §§ 3(a), 7(d).
7. Whenever and wherever the Constitution is applicable, it generally requires: (1) a trial by
jury; (2) that the jury trial be a speedy and public one; (3) the right to confront witnesses and
subpoena defense witnesses; (4) proof beyond a "reasonable doubt" for criminal convictions in
general, and detailed procedural protections to ensure accuracy before the death penalty is
imposed; and (5) indictment by a grand jury. See U.S. CONST. art. Ili, § 2 (providing the right to a
jury trial); id. amend. VI (providing the "right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury");
id. (requiring that an accused have the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
[and] to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor"); In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, 364 (1970) (requiring the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard in state criminal trials);
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (requiring individualized consideration of mitigating factors
in sentencing individuals to death); U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer
for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury,
except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time
of War or public danger .... ); see also Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 307 (1946)
(observing that "military tribunals ... fail to afford" "established procedural safeguards" that
"are prized privileges of our system").
8. The Order states that, "at a minimum," the Secretary of Defense is to issue regulations that
"provide for ... a full and fair trial, with the military commission sitting as the triers of both fact
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some of the dramatic problems plaguing the Order, such as its authorization
for the tribunals to operate in secret, without any publicity to check their
abuses and with no threshold requirement of a showing that such secrecy is
needed,9 and its grant of permission to impose the death penalty without a
unanimous vote either on guilt or on the sentence."0 Even with regulations
to plug those holes, however, the tribunals would by design eschew both
grand jury presentment and jury trial, and would employ-as the triers of
fact and law-military officers who lack the insulation of Article Inl judges,
being wholly dependent on the discretion of their military superiors for
promotions and indeed for their livelihood. Furthermore, the Order does not
guarantee an appeal from any conviction or sentence to judges independent
of the executive branch.1' Rather, language in the Order strongly suggests a
desire to eliminate even habeas corpus review of the legality of the entire
scheme and of the tribunals' jurisdiction over particular individuals.1 2
and law," with admissibility of all evidence that has "probative value to a reasonable person,"
and with conviction and sentencing "only upon the concurrence of two-thirds of the members of
the commission present." Military Order, supra note 3, § 4(c)(2)-(3), (6)-(7). We understand the
words "at a minimum" to suggest that the Secretary may provide for procedural protections that
go beyond those specified in the Military Order.
9. Id. § 4(c)(4).
10. See id. § 4(c)(6)-(7). The regulations being contemplated as of this writing would
apparently require a unanimous verdict in order to sentence someone to death. See Neil A. Lewis,
Rules on Tribunal Require Unanimity on Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2001, at Al.
11. Those cases holding that no appeal need be provided as a matter of right, such as McKane
v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894), do not override the basic right to have someone other than
one's accuser assess one's guilt. Cf. Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (K.B. 1610)
(stating that a person cannot be a judge in his own cause). An "appeal" to the chief prosecutor
himself cannot satisfy due process where the judgment appealed from was rendered by a body
"whose personnel are in the executive chain of command." Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 36 (1957).
Just as the Court has found some appeal to a neutral judge essential as a matter of due process
even in certain cases involving only monetary penalties and no criminal punishment at all, see
Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 430-32 (1994), such an appeal is required by due
process here given that the tribunals are determining guilt in the first instance. And it is, of course,
settled that to the degree an appeal is provided, due process demands that it be an appeal to a
disinterested body. See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 821-25 (1986).
12. The Order states:
(I) [M]ilitary tribunals shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to offenses by the
individual; and
(2) the individual shall not be privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any
proceeding, directly or indirectly, or to have any such remedy or proceeding sought on
the individual's behalf, in (i) any court of the United States, or any State thereof,
(ii) any court of any foreign nation, or (iii) any international tribunal.
Military Order, supra note 3, § 7(b). The Order also provides for submission of the trial record
and any conviction "for review and final decision" by the President or Secretary of Defense. Id
§ 4(c)(8).
The White House Counsel has nonetheless stated that the "[o]rder preserves judicial review
in civilian courts. Under the order, anyone arrested, detained or tried in the United States by a
military commission will be able to challenge the lawfulness of the commission's jurisdiction
through a habeas corpus proceeding in a federal court." Gonzales, supra note 5 (emphasis added).
When similar language was used during World War II, the Court construed it to permit certain
habeas corpus actions. See infra text accompanying note 85.
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The Order is so written that virtually any act by an alien, anywhere,
could, in theory, give the President "reason to believe" the alien either has
or once had some form of tribunal-triggering involvement with some
international terrorist organization. 3 The Order expressly covers all those
who have ever "aid[ed] or abet[ted]" terrorists "or act[ed] in preparation
[]for" terrorism. 4 In contradistinction to its harboring provision, which
covers only those who "knowingly harbored" terrorists or members of al
Qaeda, this provision conspicuously contains no mens rea requirement at
all." And if the Order is taken to supply the substantive definition of the
offenses triable by, as well as to outline the jurisdiction of, the tribunals,
then the absence of a mens rea requirement would bring within the Order's
sweep a vast sphere of entirely innocent conduct, such as hiring a car for a
friend when the friend turns out to be a terrorist, or donating money to a
charity when that charity turns out to be a front for terrorism. We hope the
Order was not intended to try to criminalize such acts, but its words
encourage the broadest of constructions, and its vagueness invites arbitrary
and potentially discriminatory determinations as to which categories of
persons, or indeed which specific individuals, are to submit to a military
trial, and which are to be spared that burden.
The White House Counsel has promised that the Order would not reach
any but "foreign enemy war criminals" -whatever that might mean.16 The
Geneva Conventions limit the ways regular soldiers who surrender or are
captured may be treated, and we take it as given that the tribunals
contemplated by the Order would be vested with no authority to try soldiers
recognizable as such. Only "unlawful combatants"-a category first
recognized by the Supreme Court in 1942 but reflecting a long-standing
distinction-may be tried in military tribunals. 7 This limitation could pose
13. It is, for example, difficult to know, under the Order's loose definition of covered
activities, exactly what sort of act "threaten[s]" an "injury to or adverse effects on the United
States, its citizens, national security, foreign policy, or economy." Military Order, supra note 3,
§ 2(a)(1)(ii). Almost any offense involving money-from counterfeiting currency, to holding up a
bank at gunpoint, to threatening to blow up the bank-could come under this description.
14. Id.
15. Compare id. § 2(a)(1)(iii) (covering those who "knowingly harbored one or more
individuals" described in other sections of the Order), with id. § 2(a)(1)(ii) (covering all those
who have "engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of international terrorism, or
acts in preparation therefor" ).
16. Gonzales, supra note 5. Mr. Gonzales has also stated that each military tribunal's
proceedings would be conducted in the open, with exceptions only for "the urgent needs of
national security." Id. It is, to be sure, nice to have the White House Counsel's personal guarantee
that this is so, but " trust me" has never been enough for the American people when their rights
have been at stake. See supra note I and accompanying text.
17. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 35 (1942). The difference between lawful and unlawful
combatants is codified in several international conventions. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts, adopted June 8, 1977, arts. 43-44, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 23-24 [hereinafter Protocol I to the
Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, adopted
Aug. 12, 1949, arts. 4-5. 6 U.S.T. 3317, 3320-22, 75 U.N.T.S. 134, 138-42; Fourth Hague
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a problem in a case such as that of captured Taliban footsoldiers whom our
military leaders suspect of harboring, or working in close concert with, al
Qaeda. Unless such combatants happen to be among al Qaeda's leadership,
they are unlikely to have been sufficiently responsible for that group's
terrorist acts to count as unlawful belligerents.
To be considered lawful belligerents, soldiers must "carry arms
openly," "have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance," and
"conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of
war." ,s In circumstances in which persons "on the approach of the enemy
spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces," however, the
requirement of recognizable military uniforms is relaxed under international
law.' 9 This would suggest that some of those fighting on behalf of the
Taliban in Afghanistan-and thus some whose status the President has been
unwilling to resolve on an individualized basis despite the Geneva
Convention's requirement that "any doubt" about status be "determined by
a competent tribunal" 2 -might in fact qualify as lawful belligerents and be
entitled to relief on habeas corpus from detention other than as prisoners of
war with all of the protections that flow from that status. The September 11
hijackers and those reasonably believed to have conspired with them, in
contrast, could not so qualify.2 Again, we assume that the Order reaches
Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, done Oct. 18, 1907, Annex, art. 1,
36 Stat. 2277, 2295-96. Like many legal rules, the distinction is not always clear. For example,
Justice Black, joined by Justices Douglas and Burton, disagreed with the majority over what
constituted unlawful belligerency in the Eisentrager case. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763,
793 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting) (" Whether obedience to commands of their Japanese superiors
would in itself constitute 'unlawful' belligerency in violation of the laws of war is not so simple a
question as the Court assumes.").
18. Fourth Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, supra note
17, Annex, art. 1, 36 Stat. at 2296.
19. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 17, art.
4(a), 6 U.S.T. at 3322, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138-40 (stating that such individuals qualify for protection
"provided they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war").
20. Id. art. 5, 6 U.S.T. at 3324, 75 U.N.T.S. at 140-42 (emphasis added); see also supra note
2 and accompanying text (discussing the Bush Administration's unwillingness to provide
individualized determinations of the status of those detained at Guantanamo Bay).
21. The Geneva Convention also affords rights to unlawful belligerents that the Military
Order appears not to guarantee. Article 75 of Protocol I to the Geneva Convention declares, for
instance, that anyone charged has the "right to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against
him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same
conditions as witnesses against him," is "presumed innocent until proven guilty according to
law," cannot "be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt," and "shall have the
right to have the judgment pronounced publicly." Protocol I to the Geneva Convention, supra
note 17, art. 75, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 37-38. These rights apply to every combatant, even mercenaries.
DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 421 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 3d ed. 2000)
(stating that unlawful combatants such as mercenaries "remain under the protection of the
fundamental guarantees, applicable to all persons, as set forth in Article 75"); L.C. GREEN, THE
CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 191, 226 (1993) (stating the same rule). Yet these
Article 75 guarantees, particularly those requiring production of witnesses and public judgments,
appear to be cut back in the Order.
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only unlawful belligerents (despite the absence of language in the Order so
restricting it), but its vagueness on that score is deeply troublesome.22
As such ambiguities reveal, the next steps require legislation if the
administration hopes to use military tribunals and defend them from judicial
invalidation, especially when many of the acts made subject to their
exclusive jurisdiction at the stroke of the President's pen would otherwise
fall within the jurisdiction of civilian courts created by Congress and fully
capable of adjudicating the cases the President would remove from their
ambit. Surely, it is not within the President's power to detain, and to
threaten with trial by a military tribunal, anyone who associates with agents
of terror.23 Yet the Order installs the executive branch as lawgiver as well as
law-enforcer, law-interpreter, and law-applier, 4 asserting for the executive
22. One other aspect of the Military Order does not appear to be under consideration for
administrative modification. The Military Order permits the indefinite detention of any alien the
President suspects to be a member of al Qaeda, anyone he suspects of terrorism, or anyone who
aids or abets such individuals. This detention power is in no way contingent on proving that the
laws of war have been violated, and there is actually no requirement of an eventual trial or
tribunal in the Order. See Military Order, supra note 3, § 2(b) (" [T]he Secretary of Defense shall
take all necessary measures to ensure that any individual subject to this order is detained in
accordance with section 3, and, if the individual is to be tried, that such individual is tried only in
accordance with section 4." (emphasis added)); id. § 3 (providing conditions for detention); id.
§ 4 ("Any individual subject to this order shall, when tried, be tried by military commission ....
(emphasis added)).
23. Such unbounded power flies in the face of decisions such as City of Chicago v. Morales,
527 U.S. 41 (1999), which held that the City of Chicago's response to street gangs-enacting
legislation that allowed the police to arrest and prosecute anyone who, loitering near a known
gang member, did not disperse upon police command-was facially unconstitutional in essentially
delegating to those who enforce the law the vaguely bounded power to make it on the spot. Justice
Thomas characterized the gangs as quasi-terrorists, describing them as "fill[ing] the daily lives of
many of our poorest and most vulnerable citizens with .. terror." Id. at 99 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). The Court struck down the Chicago ordinance on its face-without waiting until
particular individuals were convicted or even charged. The judicial response to the Military Order,
despite Bush Administration efforts to describe it as more like a mere press release than a real
order, see Gonzales, supra note 5, could be harsher still. For at least the Chicago threat carried
with it the guarantee that nobody would be arrested without first receiving a clear and
individualized warning-and that anyone could avoid arrest and prosecution simply by heeding
that warning and dispersing when ordered to do so. The Military Order carries no such
corresponding assurance.
24. The Order confuses the role of legislator, policeman, prosecutor, judge, and court of
appeal, concentrating all of these powers in the executive branch. For the role of the legislator, see
Military Order, supra note 3, §§ 4(b), 6(a), which gives the power to promulgate "orders and
regulations" necessary for commissions to the Secretary of Defense; id. § 2(a), which states that
the President shall "determine from time to time in writing" who is a terrorist subject to the
commissions; and id. § 4(c)(5), which provides that the Secretary of Defense should
"designate[]" persons to "conduct... prosecution." For the role of the policeman, see id. § 3(a),
which provides the power to "detain[] at an appropriate location." For the role of the prosecutor,
see id. § 4(a), which provides trial "for any and all offenses triable by military commission" and
punishment including life imprisonment or death. For the role of the judge, see id. § 4(c)(2). For
the role of the court of appeal, see id. § 4(c)(8), which provides for "review and final decision by
[the President] or by the Secretary of Defense if so designated by [the President] for that
purpose." In fact, the President himself is empowered to take on both the role of prosecutor, in
determining who is to be subject to the tribunal under section 2(a), and of ultimate court of appeal
under section 4(c)(8).
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branch the prerogative to revise the jurisdictional design of the system of
criminal justice and leaving to the executive the specification, by
substantive rules promulgated as it goes along, of what might constitute
"terrorism" or a "terrorist" group and a host of other specifics left largely
to the imagination. This "blending of executive, legislative, and judicial
powers in one person or even in one branch of the government is ordinarily
regarded as the very acme of absolutism." 5
II. THE PRECONDITION OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORIZATION
In brief, our position is that the Constitution sets up a structure whereby
the concurrence of all three branches is normally needed in order to
authorize a decisive departure from the legal status quo. Certainly, when a
president is to take action that puts basic constitutional guarantees at risk,
legislative authorization is presumptively required. Nothing in the
Constitution, including the Commander-in-Chief Clause, alters this basic
constitutional arrangement. Like any precept in constitutional discourse,
this presumption may be overcome in circumstances where the President is
manifestly unable to consult in a timely way with Congress before decisive
action must be taken. But in the absence of an emergency that threatens
truly irreparable damage to the nation or its Constitution, that Constitution's
text, structure, and logic demand approval by Congress if life, liberty, or
property are to be significantly curtailed or abridged. Nothing less is meant
by the Constitution's simple but majestic command that no person "be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." 2 The
military trial of "unlawful combatants" is no different: Congress at a
minimum must clearly provide by law for the trial of such combatants by
military commissions; it can do so either through a formal declaration of
war or by specific authorizing legislation."
Throughout its history, there have been times when our nation has
proceeded on the premise that civil trials and various other protections
25. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 11 (1957).
26. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added). Hereinafter, "liberty" will be a synecdoche for
the three categories of life, liberty, and property.
27. It is imperative that Congress not retroactively criminalize conduct that "was innocent
when done; nor make more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission; nor
deprive one charged with crime of any defense available according to law at the time when the act
was committed." Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 52 (1990). Provided a congressional act
has none of these effects, and does not increase the defendant's evidentiary burden, Carmell v.
Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 531 (2000), its action will not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. See also
Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380 (1898) (finding no violation where a statute permitted the
introduction of expert handwriting testimony as competent evidence, despite the fact that the rule
in place at the time of the offense did not permit such evidencc to be introduced). However,
"[a]pplication of a new jurisdictional rule usually 'takes away no substantive right but simply
changes the tribunal that is to hear the case."' Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 274
(1994) (citation omitted).
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ordinarily entailed by due process need not, and in all fairness should not,
be demanded. Yet those circumstances have been rare, carefully
circumscribed, and virtually never defined by a single person. Unacceptable
danger lurks if power to define such extraordinary circumstances is left in
the hands of any one individual, however earnestly he may believe the
nation is in grave peril. The need for congressional authorization, while
always important, is never more so than when the judiciary cannot be relied
upon to enforce the Constitution with all due vigor. The requirement that
the executive branch persuade Congress of the need for measures that
jeopardize liberty dampens the tendency of the executive to undertake such
measures without the clearest necessity. Formal involvement by Congress,
through a joint resolution or bill, is the least that we ordinarily require in
order to provide the transparency, perspective, and wisdom needed to
authorize measures that might well be, but need not invariably be,
unconstitutional even with such involvement.28
In the Sections that follow, we outline a model of military action by the
executive branch that we believe harmonizes two central ideas of our
Constitution: that the President should possess broad military powers, and
that government should strive mightily to avoid unwarranted deprivations
of liberty. The Constitution commits several distinct tasks to the
President-as the chief executive of the government, he serves as head of
state in dealing with foreign governments, has responsibility for "tak[ing]
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,"29 and functions as Commander
in Chief of the armed forces. In performing each of these tasks, he (or,
someday, she) has a broad set of implied powers that may be exercised
without congressional authorization and a narrow set of powers that may be
exercised even in the face of purported congressional prohibition. In the
latter category, the President can veto bills, make recess appointments,
remove purely executive officials at will, receive ambassadors, convene
Congress "on extraordinary Occasions," and adjourn Congress when there
is internal disagreement about when to adjourn.3" In each of these
circumstances, even explicit disapproval by a majority in Congress cannot
trump the structure of the Constitution. These occasions are marked with
some specificity by the Constitution itself.3
28. Cf. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME
219 (1998) (stating that a congressional directive gives the President power to do things he cannot
otherwise do, but noting that "Congress may not always grant the President all of the authority for
which he asks").
29. U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 3.
30. Id. art. 11, §§ 2-3.
31. The Constitution does not make explicit the President's power to remove at will purely
executive officers whose subjection to the President's political will is inherent in their role, but
such a power is quite a plausible inference from the Constitution's structure of separated powers.
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926).
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On each such occasion, the Constitution's structure notably makes it
unusually difficult for the President unilaterally to change the legal status
quo, at least when such a change is bound to generate broad "externalities"
beyond the functioning of the executive department. To effect these broader
changes, the Constitution specifies that Congress must first vest the
executive with additional authority, just as it must first vest jurisdiction in
the judicial branch or in other "Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court" 32
to hear certain categories of cases. Against this broad backdrop, we turn to
the specific issue of military tribunals.
A. The Implications of the Constitution's Text and Structure
Military tribunals implicate the oft-recognized tension in foreign affairs
between Congress's power to "declare War"3 3 and the President's
"Commander in Chief' 34 power. They also crucially implicate several other
congressional powers: "To define and punish... Offences against the Law
of Nations,"35 "To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization,", 36 "To
make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
Forces," 37 "To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court,"3 and,
most generally, the power to make law.39 Despite the more sweeping grant
of power to the President in the opening Vesting Clause of Article II, these
other texts create a framework that requires legislative approval for all
significant deprivations of liberty.' This framework is itself a fractal of a
larger order, for the Constitution's entire structure creates a "rights-
protecting asymmetry" whereby the concurrence of all three branches is
necessary before the government may decisively alter anyone's legal rights
or entitlements: In a word, these rights may not be curtailed except pursuant
to duly enacted law. Congress must pass a bill with the President's consent
or by a two-thirds vote over his veto;4 the President must enforce the
32. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 9.
33. Id. art. 1,§8, cl. 11.
34. ld. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
35. Id. art. 1, § 8, cl. 10.
36. Id art. 1, § 8, cl. 4.
37. Id. art. 1, § 8, cl. 14.
38. Id. art. 1, § 8, cl. 9.
39. Id. art. I, § 7.
40. Compare id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 ("The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America."), with id. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress .... "). See also Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 118 (1926) ("The
executive power was given in general terms, strengthened by specific terms where emphasis was
regarded as appropriate, and was limited by direct expressions where limitation was
needed .... "). Neither the text of the Vesting Clauses nor the cast given to them in Myers goes so
far as to authorize presidential action in circumstances that entrench on Congress's Article I,
Section 8 powers.
41. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7, cls. 1-2. See generally Neal Kumar Katyal, Legislative
Constitutional Interpretation, 50 DuKE L.J. 1335, 1368-69 (2001) (discussing the Constitution's
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resulting law (and can pardon anyone convicted under it),
42 and the courts
must be given an opportunity to rule on the constitutionality of the
government's action.43 Each branch has the power to block a change that
alters the baseline of individual liberty, and in the case of the political
branches, inaction alone cannot suffice to constitute assent. This design was
no accident. The colonists who wrote our Declaration of Independence
penned, among their charges against the King, that "He has affected to
render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil Power";'
"depriv[ed] us, in many Cases, of the Benefits of Trial by Jury";45 and
"made Judges dependent on his Will alone." 
4 6
Against this structure, the Bush Administration has sought to convert
the singular Commander-in-Chief Clause into a textual warrant for
exceptional unilateralism. 7 Yet, as broad as the Commander-in-Chief
power is, it is not unlimited. In particular, the Law-of-Nations Clause
means that Congress must enact positive law if offenses are to be
punished.4" Even so strong a defender of executive power as Alexander
"rights-protecting asymmetry"). The President has the power to veto a law he thinks
unconstitutional. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7, cl. 2.
42. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
43. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
44. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 14 (U.S. 1776); see also Laird v. Tatum, 408
U.S. 1, 19 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (finding that this clause restricts the power of the
military); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 29 (1957) (discussing this clause).
45. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20 (U.S. 1776).
46. Id. para. 11.
47. E.g., The Department of Justice and Terrorism: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm.,
107th Cong. (2001) (LEXIS, Nexis Library, Federal News Service File) [hereinafter Terrorism
Hearings] (statement of John Ashcroft, Attorney General) (emphasizing that "the President's
authority to establish war crimes commissions arises out of his power as commander-in-chief');
id. ("I believe, that's clearly the power of the president and his power to undertake that
unilaterally. The Supreme Court did address in the Quirin case, 60 years ago, the issue of war
crimes commissions. And in that case, it cited the authority of the congressional declaration of
war as language recognizing the president's power to create war crimes commissions. But I don't
believe that the court indicates or predicates its assumption and accordance of the president that
power upon that particular authority."); Preserving Freedoms While Defending Against
Terrorism: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 107th Cong. (2001) (LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Federal News Service File) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) ("Because the president's power to
establish military commissions arises out of his constitutional authority as commander-in-chief, an
act of Congress is unnecessary.").
48. See infra text accompanying notes 70-78. Offenses against the law of nations, Justice
Story wrote, "cannot with any accuracy be said to be completely ascertained and defined, in any
public code recognized by the common consent of nations," so that "there is a peculiar fitness in
giving to Congress the power to define, as well as to punish." JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1163, at 89 (Melville Bigelow ed., William S.
Hein & Co. 5th ed. 1994) (1833). Case law recognizes a similar point for criminal law and
military law. See United States v. Hudson, II U.S. (7 Crunch) 32, 34 (1812) ("The legislative
authority of the Union must first make an act a crime, affix a punishment to it, and declare the
Court that shall have jurisdiction of the offence."); Bums v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953)
("Military law, like state law, is a jurisprudence which exists separate and apart from the law
which governs in our federal judicial establishment. This Court has played no role in its
development; we have exerted no supervisory power over the courts which enforce it .... The
Framers expressly entrusted that task to Congress." (citation omitted)). Indeed, without
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Hamilton described the Commander-in-Chief Clause. as "amount[ing] to
nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and
naval forces, as first General and Admiral of the confederacy; while that of
the British King extends to the declaring of war."4 9 But ours is not so
wooden an approach as to insist that this power does nothing more than
confirm the President's role as Congress's chief puppet. In the theatre of a
war, the President does not need congressional permission to decide how
and when, within the laws of war and other applicable rules of international
law, to take custody of enemy combatants upon their capture or surrender
for the purpose of detention until the war ends and repatriation is possible.
That much is implicit in the commander-in-chief function itself.
The moment the President moves beyond detaining enemy combatants
as war prisoners to actually adjudicating their guilt and meting out
punishment, however, he has moved outside the perimeter of his role as
Commander in Chief of our armed forces and entered a zone that involves
judging and punishing alleged violations of the laws, including the law of
nations (which encompasses the laws of war). In that adjudicatory and
punitive zone, the fact that the President entered wearing his military garb
should not blind us to the fact that he is now pursuing a different goal-
assessing guilt and meting out retrospective justice rather than waging war.
Contrast, for example, a prisoner of war punished for infractions committed
while detained in that capacity (such as killing prison guards or injuring
fellow prisoners) with a captured combatant punished for wantonly
slaughtering unarmed and wholly innocent civilians. The first case is
ancillary to the commander-in-chief function; the second is logically,
morally, and legally separable.
In our view, a president who sets out to put on trial and then to punish
offenders against the laws of war in the course of a constitutionally directed
military campaign must generally be regarded as no different from a
president who sets out to try and punish those whom he regards as
offenders against any other body of law, domestic or international, whom
the officials, properly directed by the president in any of his other core
functions, happen to encounter and detain in the course of carrying out
presidential instructions. So, for instance, if a president is traveling down
congressional guidance, military tribunals can obviously stray far beyond the circumstances of
whatever emergency might have initially justified them, sweeping up many unrelated
investigations. "Mission creep" can infect not only military operations that employ force, but also
those that involve prosecutors and judges.
49. THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 465 (Alexander Hamiton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961); see
also Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 139 (1866) (Chase, C.J., concurring) (stating that the
Clause is limited to "the command of the forces and the conduct of [military] campaigns"); JOHN
HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY 53 (1993) (outlining the limited function of the Clause);
William W. Van Alstyne, Letting Slip the Dogs of War, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 1990, at C7
(stating that the President's power is only "to pursue such war as Congress shall expressly
authorize" ).
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Pennsylvania Avenue to give his State of the Union address (or is engaged
in an exercise of his power to veto, pardon, make recess appointments,
receive ambassadors, call out the militia to protect a state from invasion, or
negotiate treaties), and a gang of thugs attempts to obstruct an exercise of
any of these powers, whatever inherent power the President might possess
to intercept and detain members of the gang so as to immobilize them from
further interference or obstruction does not extend to the very different
power to create and administer tribunals to adjudicate their guilt and to
mete out punishment. This is so even if the tribunals provide the full
panoply of Article III safeguards and Bill of Rights protections, for the
Constitution explicitly gives to Congress, not the President, the power to
make law, to define and punish offenses against the law of nations, and to
create tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court."
The Constitution also vests in Congress the power to declare war and
thereby to give the executive branch additional authority. As Justice Chase
put it soon after the Founding, "If a general war is declared, its extent and
operations are only restricted and regulated by the jus belli .... but if a
partial war is waged, its extent and operation depend on our municipal
laws." " Chief Justice Rehnquist has written:
Without question the government's authority to engage in
conduct that infringes civil liberty is greatest in time of declared
war-the Schenck and Hirabayashi opinions make this clear....
t .. [Flrom the point of view of governmental authority under
the Constitution, it is clear that the President may do many things in
carrying out a congressional directive that he may not be able to do
on his own.52
50. As we explain in Section II.B, this analysis is confined by two functional exceptions:
(1) circumstances in which enemy territory has been conquered, and the military is needed to
provide law and order in that theatre, and (2) situations where the adjudication of guilt of those
captured is immediately necessary, and Congress cannot act expeditiously enough given the
exigency.
51. Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (7 DalI.) 37, 43 (1800) (emphasis added). Justice Story's
Commentaries suggested a similar theme three decades later, claiming that war "never fails to
impose upon the people the most burdensome taxes, and personal sufferings .... It is sometimes
fatal to public liberty itself, by introducing a spirit of military glory, which is ready to follow
wherever a successful commander will lead." STORY, supra note 48, § 1171, at 92. He concludes
that it "should therefore be difficult in a republic to declare war." ld.; see also J. Gregory Sidak,
To Declare War, 41 DUKE L.J. 27, 33 (1991) (stating that only a "declaration of war fulfills
Congress's representative function because it is more immediately visible to the electorate, less
susceptible to ambiguity and disagreement once it is made, and thus more conducive to effective
monitoring of the performance of political actors").
52. REHNQUIST, supra note 28, at 218-19; see also U.S. CONST. amend. III (permitting the
government to quarter troops in private homes without the consent of owners "in time of war,"
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Several statutes reflect the Chief Justice's constitutional vision-most
notably the still-surviving 1798 Alien Enemy Act, which gives the
President the power to "secure[] and remove[]" any "citizens... or
subjects of the hostile nation" in the event of "a declared war." 53
While a declaration of war usefully confines the circumstances in
which military tribunals may be used and limits their jurisdiction to a finite
period of time, sometimes the exigencies of the threat may require
immediate action without waiting for Congress. Indeed, earlier military
tribunals-in the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, the Civil War, and
World War II--occurred during "total wars," to use Corwin's evocative
phrase-wars in which there was a real danger that America might lose its
Constitution and its way of life. 4 If these uses were defensible, the reason
is that the Constitution is not a "suicide pact."5 President Lincoln assumed
but even then confined to circumstances "prescribed by law"); 50 U.S.C. § 1829 (1994) (" [T]he
President, through the Attorney General, may authorize physical searches without a court
order.., to acquire foreign intelligence information for a period not to exceed 15 calendar days
following a declaration of war by the Congress."); Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 29-30 (D.C.
Cir. 2000) (Randolph, J., concurring) (stating that a "congressional declaration of war carries with
it profound consequences" and describing how a "declaration of war may also have the effect of
decreasing commercial choices and curtailing civil liberties"); Introduction and Summary to
Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel Relating to the Iranian Hostage Crisis, 4A Op. Off. Legal
Counsel 71, 91-92 (1984) (stating, in an opinion written by then-Assistant Attorney General
Theodore Olson, that certain statutes trigger power "only in the event of a declared war"). We do
not necessarily endorse all the activities that have been taken and upheld during declared wars, but
simply observe that a declaration of war confers additional, though not unbounded, powers to the
government. Cf Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948) ("[I]f the war power
can be used in days of peace to treat all the wounds which war inflicts on our society, it may not
only swallow up all other powers of Congress but largely obliterate the Ninth and the Tenth
Amendments as well.").
53. Act of July 6, 1798, ch. 66, § 1, 1 Stat. 577, 577. The current version of the Act is found
at 50 U.S.C. § 21, and in both the original form and the present version it is also triggered by a
threatened or actual "invasion or predatory incursion... by any foreign nation or government."
Id.; see also United States ex rel. Jaegclcr v. Carusi, 342 U.S. 347, 348 (1952) ("The statutory
power of the Attorney General to remove petitioner as an enemy alien ended when Congress
terminated the war with Germany. Thus petitioner is no longer removable under the Alien Enemy
Act."); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 775 (1950) (describing how the Alien Enemy Act is
triggered only by a declaration of war and opining that, when such a state of war exists, "courts
will not inquire into any other issue as to [an alien enemy's) internment"); Ludecke v. Watkins,
335 U.S. 160, 166 n.I 1 (1948) (rejecting the view that the legislative history of the Alien Enemy
Act shows that "declared war" meant "state of actual hostilities"); J. Gregory Sidak, War,
Liberty, and Enemy Aliens, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1402, 1402 (1992) (describing the Alien Enemy
Act and stating that "a formal declaration of war" is "valuable" because it "forces Congress to
acknowledge publicly, and to accept, that one cost of waging war is that individual liberty in the
United States might have to suffer" ).
54. EDWARD S. CORWIN, TOTAL WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION (1947). Corwin described
total war as "the politically ordered participation in the war effort of all personal and social
forces, the scientific, the mechanical, the commercial, the economic, the moral, the literary and
artistic, and the psychological." Id. at 4.
55. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963). Chief Justice Marshall surely
had it right in the most important structural analysis of our Constitution to be found in the pages
of the United States Reports, McCulloch v. Maryland: The Constitution is "intended to endure for
ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs." 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819).
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as much in his unilateral decisions at the outset of the Civil War and in his
jolting question respecting his suspension of the law guaranteeing access to
the writ of habeas corpus: "[A]re all the laws but one to go unexecuted, and
the government itself go to pieces lest that one be violated?" 5 6 Importantly,
however, Lincoln then asked Congress for, and obtained, retroactive
approval of his extraordinary exercises of power.57
Plainly, the President's emergency power to save the Constitution and
country must be most sparingly used, for without the sturdiest limits that
power could eclipse all our constitutional guarantees. Constitutional
doctrine has recognized this basic proposition-most dramatically in the
Steel Seizure Case,5" which is perhaps the Court's most important attempt
to fit the needs of executive branch decisionmaking at times of crisis within
our constitutional tradition. Then, as now, the country was embroiled in
military conflict but not a declared war; President Truman claimed the
emergency (the threatened disruption of arms shipments to our troops
fighting in Korea) to be so grave that, under his commander-in-chief power,
he had to take temporary control of the steel mills through an executive
order.
The Court rejected President Truman's claim, holding that the President
could not take such action unilaterally when war had not been declared.
Justice Black's majority opinion found the Order unconstitutional because
seizing the mills was "a job for the Nation's lawmakers, not for its military
authorities.... In the framework of our Constitution, the President's power
to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a
lawmaker." 59
56. Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in 6
COMPLETE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 297, 309 (John G. Nicolay & John Hay eds., n.p.,
Lincoln Mem'l Univ. 1894).
57. See infra note 186 and accompanying text.
58. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
59. Id. at 587 (Black, J.). For Justice Douglas, President Truman's decision not to seek
congressional approval in advance violated the Constitution because the seizure triggered the Just
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 631 (Douglas, J., concurring). The seizure,
Justice Douglas argued, presented Congress with a fait accompli-a circumstance where it was
bound to raise revenues that it might have chosen not to raise-in order to satisfy just
compensation obligations that it might have chosen ex ante not to incur. Id. at 631-32. Even
though legislative action might "often be cumbersome, time-consuming, and apparently
inefficient," Justice Douglas wrote, such action was the process our Constitution envisioned. Id.
at 629; see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 36-37 (1985) (describing
Douglas's views on legislative silence). While the various concurrences in the case make it
difficult to draw a coherent rule, many, perhaps a majority, of the Justices believed that the
President can act when Congress is silent in a particularly grave emergency. See Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring); id. at 662 (Clark, J., concurring); id.
at 683-84 (Vinson, CJ., dissenting).
We believe that, in cases where individual rights are put at risk by executive action,
Congress's silence should not be construed as a green light for the executive absent extremely rare
circumstances. See TRIBE, supra, at 39-40 (outlining the view that "there must be a heavy burden
on anyone seeking to find a yes in Congress' silence" and that due process principles would
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Justice Jackson's concurrence outlined the three now-canonical
categories that guide modem analysis of separation of powers-the first,
where the President acts pursuant to express or implied authorization by
Congress; the second, where the President acts in the absence of
congressional approval or disapproval of his action; and the third, where the
President takes measures incompatible with the express or implied will of
Congress. In discussing the limits of the President's power within these
three zones, Justice Jackson leveled a forceful warning against unilateral
assertions of the commander-in-chief power in the name of national
security:
Nothing in our Constitution is plainer than that a declaration of a
war is entrusted only to Congress. Of course, a state of war may in
fact exist without a formal declaration. But no doctrine that the
Court could promulgate would seem to me more sinister and
alarming than that a President whose conduct of foreign affairs is
so largely uncontrolled, and often even is unknown, can vastly
enlarge his mastery over the internal affairs of the country by his
own commitment of the Nation's armed forces to some foreign
venture.6 °
Proceeding from the premise that a formal declaration of war gives the
President fearsome powers, Justice Jackson read in the Constitution's text
and design, as illuminated by relevant history, a prohibition against giving
the President the unilateral power to define such a state of war or to act as
though he had.6' Thus, the President's commander-in-chief power
generally require affirmative congressional action); Neal Kumar Katyal, Judges as Advicegivers,
50 STAN. L. REv. 1709, 1716, 1757-67 (1998) (describing the virtues of clear-statement rules
when government action is close to the constitutional line).
60. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 642 (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Jackson
also stated:
Aside from suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus ... [the Founders]
made no express provision for exercise of extraordinary authority because of a crisis. I
do not think we rightfully may so amend their work, and, if we could, I am not
convinced it would be wise to do so .... [T]he President of the [German] Republic,
without concurrence of the Reichstag, was empowered temporarily to suspend any or
all individual rights if public safety and order were seriously disturbed or endangered.
This proved a temptation to every government, whatever its shade of opinion, and in 13
years suspension of rights was invoked on more than 250 occasions. Finally, Hitler
persuaded President Von Hindenberg to suspend all such rights, and they were never
restored.
Id. at 650-51 (footnote omitted).
61. The fact that a formal war was not declared also gave Justice Frankfurter pause. See id. at
613 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("In this case, reliance on the powers that flow from declared
war has been commendably disclaimed by the Solicitor General."). Similarly, in the Pentagon
Papers Case, N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), Justice Douglas rejected the
executive branch's claim that "the power to wage war successfully" justifies a prior restraint,
reasoning that "the war power stems from a declaration of war" and that it was therefore
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is not such an absolute as might be implied from that office in a
militaristic system but is subject to limitations consistent with a
constitutional Republic whose law and policy-making branch is a
representative Congress.... No penance would ever expiate the sin
against free government of holding that a President can escape
control of executive powers by law through assuming his military
role.62
Justice Jackson's articulation of the constitutional limits upon the
commander-in-chief power makes good structural sense: Congress alone
can see the problem whole; the Chief Executive tends to be blinded by the
single-minded requirements of his military mission, and courts necessarily
see but one case at a time and in wartime tend to defer to the executive's
assumed greater knowledge and expertise, coupled with the executive's
electoral legitimacy.63 For such reasons, the President should not be
permitted, simply by donning his military garb, to do in this country what
he could never do in merely executive dress.
Needless to say, this principle loses much if not all of its force when
waiting for Congress to act would manifestly be a prescription for exposing
the nation to a devastating military defeat or to some grave and irreparable
harm.' In declaring war, Congress for all practical purposes determines that
we should deem conclusive the President's unilateral judgment as
unnecessary to decide "what leveling effect the war power of Congress might have." Id. at 722
(Douglas, J., concurring).
62. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 645-46 (Jackson, J., concurring); see also id.
at 655 ("The Executive, except for recommendation and veto, has no legislative power. The
executive action we have here originates in the individual will of the President and represents an
exercise of authority without law.").
63. Consider Justice Jackson's thoughts in his Korematsu dissent, explaining that if courts
defer to the executive and uphold these unilaterally created tribunals, Americans will then be left
with a dangerous precedent that can be used to undermine constitutional guarantees in other
situations:
[A] judicial construction of the due process clause that will sustain this order is a far
more subtle blow to liberty than the promulgation of the order itself. A military order,
however unconstitutional, is not apt to last longer than the military emergency .... But
once a judicial opinion rationalizes such an order to show that it conforms to the
Constitution, . . the Court for all time has validated the principle of racial
discrimination in criminal procedure and of transplanting American citizens. The
principle then lies about like a loaded weapon .... Every repetition embeds that
principle more deeply in our law and thinking and expands it to new purposes.... A
military commander may overstep the bounds of constitutionality, and it is an incident.
But if we review and approve, that passing incident becomes the doctrine of the
Constitution. There it has a generative power of its own, and all that it creates will be in
its own image.
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 245-46 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
64. See 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4-6, at 668-69 (3d ed.
2000) (noting that even an undeclared war can have a "dramatic effect... on the civil liberties of
Americans" and concluding that '"the President should not be entitled to rely upon his augmented
wartime powers when, without peculiar difficulty, he could have submitted his proposals to
Congress for consideration as would have been required in peacetime").
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Commander in Chief that a given wartime measure must be taken without
further congressional authorization. And when America is engulfed in total
war, as it was in the Civil War, the absence of any nation against which war
might be declared should not disable the President from invoking a
presumption to the effect that waiting for Congress would unacceptably risk
the nation's future. But even on the gravest view of the threat posed to the
United States by the events of September 1 1 and by the even more
devastating attacks about which the President has recently warned the
nation,6" nothing said by the President or by anyone speaking on his behalf
remotely supports the proposition that circumstances are too exigent to
make timely congressional action a realistic option. Without that crucial
proposition, the most that might be established is the magnitude of the peril
the nation faces-not the necessity for unilateral executive action
responding to that peril with institutional measures that are ordinarily
impermissible without authorization from Congress.
However perilous the times, the fact is that Congress has responded
expeditiously. It is functioning with much more than all deliberate speed. In
record time, it considered and enacted a broad array of laws, many of them
in almost precisely the form sought by the President.66 The very passage of
not days but months between the initial promulgation of the Order
65. Text of President Bush's State of the Union Address to Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30,
2002, at A22 ("Thousands of dangerous killers, schooled in the methods of murder, often
supported by outlaw regimes, are now spread throughout the world like ticking time bombs, set to
go off without warning.").
66. E.g., Afghan Women and Children Relief Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-81, 115 Stat. 811
(Dec. 12, 2001) (authorizing the provision of educational and health care assistance to the women
and children of Afghanistan); Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115
Stat. 597 (Nov. 19, 2001) (enhancing aviation security); An Act To Authorize the President To
Exercise Waivers of Foreign Assistance Restrictions with Respect to Pakistan, Pub. L. No. 107-
57, 115 Stat. 403 (Oct. 27, 2001); Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required To Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat.
272 (Oct. 26, 2001); Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42,
115 Stat. 230 (Sept. 22, 2001) (providing funds for airlines, victims of the September II plane
crashes, and additional airline security); 2001 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for
Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States, Pub. L. No. 107-38, 115
Stat. 220 (Sept. 18, 2001) (making emergency supplemental appropriations of up to $40 billion for
additional disaster assistance, for antiterrorism initiatives, and for post-September I I recovery);
Expedited Payment for Heroic Public Safety Officers, Pub. L. No. 107-37, 115 Stat. 219 (Sept. 18,
2001) (providing expedited payment of certain benefits for public safety officers who were killed
or injured due to the September 11 attacks); Joint Resolution: To Authorize the Use of United
States Armed Forces Against Those Responsible for the Recent Attacks Launched Against the
United States, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (Sept. 18, 2001).
We do not question the claim that "the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a
representative of the nation." United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319
(1936). Rather, we believe that this power over foreign affairs does not extend so far as to
encompass the broad Order. Curtiss-Wright merely permitted broader-than-usual delegations of
power from Congress to the President in the realm of foreign affairs; it did not go so far as to
make such delegation superfluous. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 635-36 n.2
(Jackson, J., concurring); Alexander M. Bickel, Congress, the President, and the Power To Wage
War, 48 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 131, 137 (1971).
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establishing the military tribunals and the final promulgation of Defense
Department regulations setting out the details of their jurisdiction and
operation-a step not yet taken as of this writing--obviously belies any
suggestion that there would not have been time in the interim, or indeed that
there is not time now, for the President to ask Congress to enact legislation
that would give the tribunals a solid statutory footing and provide them with
the appellate and habeas review apparatus required for their even arguably
constitutional functioning. Indeed, we do not understand the President even
to have made such a suggestion, or to be claiming that his unilateralism on
this front is excused by the need to act without the delay that recourse to
Congress would entail. Unlike a sudden presidential deployment of troops
or firing of missiles, the very nature of the step at issue here-the creation
of an entire adjudicatory apparatus for the orderly processing of persons
who, upon capture, are within the control of the Commander in Chief and
aren't about to go anywhere before Congress has had time to act-would
render utterly incredible any claim that it is for want of time that the
President has had to circumvent the legislative process. And yet the
Military Order spectacularly bypassed that process. In doing so, it usurped
the legislative powers vested by the Constitution exclusively in Congress
and threatened the Constitution's rights-protecting asymmetry.
Under the Order, the executive branch acts as lawmaker, law-enforcer,
and judge. That is what James Madison warned against when he wrote:
"The accumulation of all powers legislative, executive, and judiciary in the
same hands, whether of one, a few or many, and whether hereditary, self-
appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of
tyranny." 67
B. Constitutional Precedent for Military Tribunals
1. Milligan
In the Civil War-era Milligan case, a group of men had been detained in
Indiana and tried before a military commission in Indianapolis for
conspiracy against the United States. The men were accused of planning an
armed uprising that would seize Union weapons, liberate Confederate
prisoners of war, and kidnap the Governor of Indiana. Milligan filed a
habeas petition in federal circuit court challenging the jurisdiction of the
commission to hear the case against him, and the lower court then certified
the petition to the Supreme Court, which in turn granted it.6" "No graver
question was ever considered by this court, nor one which more nearly
67. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 49, at 324 (James Madison).
68. Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (I Wall.) 2, 109-10 (1866).
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concerns the rights of the whole people," the Court intoned, than whether a
military "tribunal [had] the legal power and authority" to punish
Milligan.69
The Court then announced its holding that the military trial was
unconstitutional: "Martial rule can never exist where the courts are open,
and in the proper and unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction," for the
"Constitution of the United States is the law for rulers and people, equally
in war and peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of
men, at all times, and under all circumstances." 70 While this language
might, as the partial dissenters in Milligan suggested, be overly broad in the
context of a total war in which Congress cannot act in time, it establishes a
general presumption in favor of civil trial.71 The Court specifically rejected
the claim that military "jurisdiction is complete under the 'laws and usages
of war,"' repeating that martial law cannot be applied when "the courts are
open and their process unobstructed." 72 To the Court, " [o]ne of the plainest
constitutional provisions was, therefore, infringed when Milligan was tried
by a court not ordained and established by Congress."73 The President
could not unilaterally create such a tribunal:
[F]rom what source did the military commission that tried
[Milligan] derive their authority? Certainly no part of the judicial
power of the country was conferred on them; because the
Constitution expressly vests it "in one supreme court and such
inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish," and it is not pretended that the commission was a court
ordained and established by Congress. They cannot justify on the
mandate of the President; because he is controlled by law, and has
his appropriate sphere of duty, which is to execute, not to make, the
laws; and there is no unwritten criminal code to which resort can be
had as a source of jurisdiction. 4
69. Id. at 118-19. This is precisely the issue presented by the Military Order, which
contemplates detention and "tri[al] by military commission ... and ... punish[ment]...
including life imprisonment or death." Military Order, supra note 3, §§ 3(a), 4(a).
70. MiUlligan, 71 U.S. at 120-21, 127.
71. The Court described the importance of the jury trial provisions in the Constitution, as well
as the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments, stating that "so strong was the sense of the country
of their importance, and so jealous were the people that these rights, highly prized, might be
denied them by implication" that the original Constitution "encountered severe opposition; and,
but for the belief that it would be so amended as to embrace them, it would never have been
ratified." Id. at 119-20.
72. Id. at 121.
73. Id. at 122.
74. Id. at 121 (internal quotation marks deleted).
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This was true "no matter how great an offender the individual may be, or
how much his crimes may have shocked the sense of justice of the country,
or endangered its safety." "
The Court's broad statement that "it was not in the power of Congress
to authorize' 76 military tribunals in places where civilian law was
functioning, was, of course, dictum on the facts of Milligan, and it
prompted sharp disagreement by four Justices, led by Chief Justice Chase:
We think that Congress had power, though not exercised, to
authorize the military commission which was held in Indiana.
Congress has the power not only to raise and support and
govern armies but to declare war. It has, therefore, the power to
provide by law for carrying on war. This power necessarily extends
to all legislation essential to the prosecution of war with vigor and
success ....
... Congress cannot direct the conduct of campaigns, nor can
the President, or any commander under him, without the sanction of
Congress, institute tribunals for the trial and punishment of
offences, either of soldiers or civilians, unless in cases of a
controlling necessity ....
We cannot doubt that, in such a time of public danger,
Congress had power, under the Constitution, to provide for the
organization of a military commission .... [Civilian] courts might
be open and undisturbed in the execution of their functions, and yet
wholly incompetent to avert threatened danger, or to punish, with
adequate promptitude and certainty, the guilty conspirators.77
Both the majority opinion and the Chase concurrence in Milligan hold
congressional authorization to be at least a necessary requirement for such
tribunals. This general principle of Milligan-a principle never repudiated
in subsequent cases-leaves the President little unilateral freedom to craft
75. Id. at 119.
76. Id. at 136 (Chase, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
77. Id. at 137, 139-41 (emphasis added). The four Justices made clear that they "by no means
assert[ed] that Congress can establish and apply the laws of war where no war has been declared
or exists"; rather, their opinion was confined to situations "when the nation is involved in war,
and some portions of the country are invaded, and all are exposed to invasion." Id. at 140.
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an order to detain people on his own suspicion for indefinite warehousing
or trial at his pleasure in a system of military justice.m
2. Quirin
Quirin concerned the military trial of eight Nazi saboteurs who landed
on American soil in the midst of World War II carrying explosives and
wearing uniforms that they promptly buried."9 One of them, George Dasch,
had apparently been planning to turn himself in to the authorities from the
start and promptly informed the FBI of the plan for sabotage (the FBI
mistakenly dismissed his story as a "crank call").8o Later, Dasch went to
Washington, D.C., checked into the Mayflower Hotel, and again told his
story to the FBI. The FBI did not believe him until he pulled $80,000 in
cash out of his briefcase-the equivalent of about $875,000 today. With
Dasch's help, the FBI arrested the other saboteurs and issued misleading
press releases suggesting that the Bureau's diligence resulted in the
78. These limits on executive power were made clear by Attorney General Thomas Gregory's
construction of Milligan's holding in 1918 in the case of Pable Waberski. Waberski was a German
agent who had come to the United States during World War I. He had evidently admitted to plans
to demolish various targets and to having previously demolished "munition barges, powder
magazines, and other war utilities in the United States." Trial of Spies by Military Tribunals, 31
Op. Att'y Gen. 356, 357 (1918). Nevertheless, the Attorney General opined that a military trial
would be unconstitutional:
Milligan was a citizen of the United States. But the provisions of the Constitution
upon which the decision was based are not limited to citizcns ....
... [Even] if there were no Milligan case to furnish us with an authoritative
precedent, the provisions of the Constitution would themselves plainly bring us to the
same conclusions as those set forth in the opinion of the court in that case, namely, that
in this country, military tribunals, whether courts-martial or military commissions, can
not constitutionally be granted jurisdiction to try persons charged with acts or offences
committed outside of the field of military operations or territory under martial law or
other peculiarly military territory, except members of the military or naval forces or
those immediately attached to the forces such as camp followers. Were this not the
correct conclusion, then any person accused of espionage, for instance, wherever
apprehended and wherever the act charged may have been committed, would
immediately become subject to the jurisdiction of a military court, and [the Fourth,
Fifth, and Sixth Amendments] would be rendered nugatory in the cases of the most
grave class of crimes, generally carrying the death penalty. Any other conclusion would
be tantamount to applying martial law, where no justification for martial law exists and
none had been declared, and would be a suspension of the Constitution during war
times.
Id. at 361-62. Attorney General Gregory then explained why he believed that Article II1 also
"precludes the jurisdiction of a military court." Id. at 362. Just in case there was any doubt, the
Attorney General then reproduced the passage from the Milligan majority quoted above, supra
text accompanying note 74, that it was "not pretended that the commission was a court ordained
and established by Congress," and that the President could not unilaterally create the tribunals
because he "has his appropriate sphere of duty, which [is] to execute, not to make, the laws." 31
Op. Att'y Gen. at 361-62.
79. Ex parre Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
80. David J. Danelski, The Saboteurs' Case, I J. SUP. CT. HIST. 61,64 (1996).
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arrests.8 "This was the beginning of government control on information
about the Saboteurs' Case and the government's successful use of the case
for propaganda purposes." 82
President Roosevelt shortly thereafter issued an Executive Order and
Proclamation authorizing military trials for the saboteurs. They were
charged with four offenses:
1. Violation of the law of war.
2. Violation of [an Act of Congress,] Article 81 of the Articles of
War, defining the offense of relieving or attempting to relieve, or
corresponding with or giving intelligence to, the enemy.
3. Violation of [an Act of Congress,] Article 82, defining the
offense of spying.
4. Conspiracy to commit the offenses alleged in charges 1, 2, and
3.83
Before the trials had concluded, the saboteurs filed habeas corpus petitions
in the District Court in Washington, D.C., and an original habeas corpus
petition in the U.S. Supreme Court.'
Despite language in President Roosevelt's Order that attempted to
foreclose all access to civilian courts for the saboteurs, the Supreme Court
permitted review on habeas." The Quirin Court then upheld the
constitutionality of the military tribunals, making much of the fact that war
had been declared,86 and reserving the question of the President's unilateral
81. Attorney General Francis Biddle later wrote that, as a result of this deception, "it was
generally concluded that a particularly brilliant FBI agent, probably attending the school in
sabotage where the eight had been trained, had been able to get on the inside." Id. at 65. Biddle
also wanted trial secrecy to avoid making public certain information, including the fact of Dasch's
cooperation, the FBI's ignoring of Dasch's phone call, and the delay in reporting discovery of the
saboteurs' landing. Id. at 66.
82. Id. at 65.
83. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 23.
84. After the district court denied their habeas petitions, they filed their original petitions in
the U.S. Supreme Court. After the first day of oral argument, they also filed petitions for certiorari
before judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 347(a) (1940), based on the initial district court decision. See
infra note 180 (explaining how the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over such petitions).
85. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 24-25; see also In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 9 (1946) (stating that
Congress "has not withdrawn [jurisdiction], and the Executive branch of the Government could
not, unless there was suspension of the writ [of] ... habeas corpus"); id. at 30 (Murphy, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the majority "fortunately has taken the first and most important step
toward insuring the supremacy of law and justice in the treatment of an enemy belligerent" by
affording rights of habeas corpus and rejecting the "obnoxious doctrine asserted by the
Government").
86. E.g., Quirin, 317 U.S. at 26 (stating that " [t]he Constitution thus invests the President, as
Commander in Chief, with the power to wage war which Congress has declared" (emphasis
added)). In other places, the Court used the formulation "time of war," a formulation that, for
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power.8 7 Indeed, some, perhaps even all, of the four charges brought
against the saboteurs-and not merely the tribunals before which such
charges could be heard-were explicitly authorized by Congress. Charges 2
and 3, essentially mirroring parts of the United States Code, accused the
defendants of committing specifically defined capital wartime offenses;
those federal statutes explicitly authorized trial of such crimes by military
commission.88 Charges 1 and 4 might have been either pendant to or
derivations of these specific authorizations. The Court's language hints at
the latter, for in discussing the first charge, the Court looked to the language
of a federal statute, Article 82, and emphasized that the provision had been
part of the United States Code since the Founding. 9 In fact, the
government's two specifications of the first charge each tracked the
statutory language of Articles 81 and 82. Its first specification was based on
Article 82:
The gravamen of the specification [of the first charge] is that,
contrary to the law of war, each of the accused persons, acting for
and on behalf of the German Reich, a foreign state with which the
reasons we explain, infra text accompanying notes 106-113, should be construed narrowly. See,
e.g., Quirn, 317 U.S. at 25 ("But the detention and trial of petitioners-ordered by the President
in the declared exercise of his powers as Commander in Chief of the Army in time of war and of
grave public danger-are not to be set aside by the courts without the clear conviction that they
are in conflict with the Constitution or laws of Congress constitutionally enacted." (emphasis
added)); id. at 35 (stating that "those who during time of war pass surreptitiously from enemy
territory into our own.., have the status of unlawful combatants punishable as such by military
commission" (emphasis added)); id. at 42 (" [Ilt has never been suggested in the very extensive
literature of the subject that an alien spy, in time of war, could not be tried by military tribunal
without a jury." (emphasis added)). President Roosevelt's Proclamation itself stated that
"all persons who are subjects, citizens or residents of any nation at war with the United
States... and who during time of war enter or attempt to enter the United
States ... through coastal or boundary defenses, and are charged with committing or
attempting or preparing to commit sabotage, espionage, hostile or warlike acts, or
violations of the law of war, shall be subject to the law of war and to the jurisdiction of
military tribunals."
Id. at 22-23 (emphasis added).
87. Id. at 29 ("It is unnecessary for present purposes to determine to what extent the
President as Commander in Chief has constitutional power to create military commissions without
the support of Congressional legislation. For here Congress has authorized trial of offenses against
the law of wa before such commissions.").
88. See Act of Aug. 29, 1916, ch. 418, § 3, art. 82, 39 Stat. 619, 663 ("Any person who in
time of war shall be found lurking or acting as a spy in or about any of the fortifications, posts,
quarters, or encampments of any of the armies of the United States, or elsewhere, shall be tried by
general court-martial or by a military commission, and shall, on conviction thereof, suffer death."
(emphasis added)), id. § 3, art. 81, 39 Stat. at 663 ("Whosoever relieves the enemy with arms,
ammunition, supplies, money, or other thing... shall suffer death, or such other punishment as a
court-martial or military commission may direct." (emphasis added)).
89. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 41. In support of a reading that treats the Court as having found
adequate statutory authorization in Article 82, consider also the Court's later description that, in
Quirin, "the military commission's conviction of saboteurs ... was upheld on charges of
violating the law of war as defined by statute." Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 355 n.22
(1952) (emphasis added). The language "defined by statute" may of course have been imprecise,
as other language about Quirin upholding "conviction[s]" certainly was.
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United States is at war... secretly passed through coastal military
or naval lines or defenses of the United States and, in civilian dress,
went within zones of military operations or elsewhere behind one or
more of those lines or defenses.9"
The second specification was based on Article 81, for it charged that "each
of the accused persons, acting for and on behalf of the German Reich...
appeared within zones of military operations or elsewhere.., and there...
assembled together explosives or money or other supplies."9 To be sure,
the Court also described in detail-and read as jurisdiction-conferring
rather than merely as jurisdiction-preserving-another (still-extant)
provision, Article 15, which recognized that the jurisdiction of military
tribunals over violations of the laws of war was concurrent with the
jurisdiction of courts-martial.9" While Quirin did not say which statute-
Article 15, Article 81, Article 82, or perhaps a combination of all three-
was necessary to confer jurisdiction, on the record in Quirin Congress had
in fact specifically authorized the use of military tribunals for at least some,
and perhaps all, of the charges against the saboteurs.
Regrettably, the Court's hurried after-the-fact opinion did not expressly
rely on the language of Articles 81 or 82. Perhaps the obvious similarity
between the first specification and the statutory Article 82 prompted the
Court to uphold the first specification without pointing to that Article as the
clear basis for the military commission's jurisdiction or ruling on the
second and third charges. That the Court adverted to Article 15, rather than
to Articles 81 or 82, in its jurisdictional analysis cannot negate the fact that
Article 15 by its terms merely removes any inference that the jurisdiction of
courts-martial is exclusive of military commissions.9 3 Because Quirin's
language contains the principal decisional support that the defenders of the
current Military Order tend to cite,94 it is worth considering the differences
between the two circumstances-past and present-in some detail.
90. Brief of the Respondent app. III, at 78, Quirin (Orig. Nos. 1-7), reprinted in 39
LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 397, 479 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975) [hereinafter
LANDMARK BRIEFS] (emphasis added).
91. Id. at 79, reprinted in 39 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 90, at 480 (emphasis added).
92. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 27. This provision now reads: "The provisions of this chapter
conferring jurisdiction upon courts-martial do not deprive military commissions, provost courts, or
other military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders or offenses that by
statute or by the law of war may be tried by military commissions, provost courts, or other
military tribunals." 10 U.S.C. § 821 (1994) (emphasis added).
93. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 35, 46. At the time the Supreme Court rendered its decision (but not
its opinion), the saboteurs had not yet been found guilty of any offenses. See Danelski, supra note
80, at 71.
94. Indeed, President Bush recently stated, "I would remind those who don't understand the
decision I made that Franklin Roosevelt made the same decision in World War II. Those were
extraordinary times, as well." Mike Allen, Bush Defends Order for Military Tribunals, WASH.
POST, Nov. 20, 2001, at A14.
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3. The Differences Between the Roosevelt and Bush Orders
Our general argument is that Congress must specifically authorize the
use of military tribunals before their use is allowed, even for unlawful
combatants charged with violations of the laws of war. In Quirin, this
authorization was the result of several legislative decisions stitched
together. First, Congress had declared war and had underscored the
government's total commitment to the war effort:
[T]he state of war between the United States and the Government
of Germany... is hereby formally declared; and the President is
hereby authorized and directed to employ the entire naval and
military forces of the United States and the resources of the
government to carry on war against the Government of Germany;
and, to bring the conflict to a successful termination, all of the
resources of the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the
United States.95
Nothing even close to that World War II authorization, or a wartime
emergency in which Congress's consent cannot be obtained, is present
today. Significantly, the Resolution passed by Congress several days after
the September 11 terrorist attacks permits only the use of "force"; applies
only to persons or other entities involved in some way in the September 11
attacks; and then extends only to the "prevent[ion of] ... future acts of
international terrorism against the United States by such nations,
In another World War HI case, the Court faced the issue of the executive's authority to order
military tribunals in the Philippines to try violators of the law of war. In In re Yamashita, 327 U.S.
1 (1946), General Yamashita of the Imperial Japanese Army was tried and convicted by a military
commission ordered under the President's authority. The Court pointed to three executive
announcements about the need for such military tribunals and three treaties that were ratified and
codified in the United States Code that made what Yamashita did a crime. Id. at 10-11, 15-16.
Yamashita read Quirin to permit military tribunals to try offenses against the law of war, but it
explicitly tethered its view to a declaration of war. The Yamashita Court held that the trial and
punishment of enemies who violate the law of war is "an exercise of the authority sanctioned by
Congress to administer the system of military justice recognized by the law of war. That sanction
is without qualification as to the exercise of this authority so long as a state of war exists-from
its declaration until peace is proclaimed." Id. at 11-12 (emphasis added); see also id. at 12 ("The
war power, from which the commission derives its existence, is not limited to victories in the
field, but carries with it the inherent power ... to remedy, at least in ways Congress has
recognized, the evils which the military operations have produced." (emphasis added)). The Court
went on to note that its constitutional holding was limited to that circumstance only, and that "it is
unnecessary to consider what, in other situations, the Fifth Amendment might require, and as to
that no intimation one way or the other is to be implied." Id. at 23.
95. Joint Resolution of Dec. 11, 1941, Pub. L. No. 77-331, 55 Stat. 796, 796 (emphasis
added). In Quirin, total war was involved, for the Nazi saboteurs "were invaders, their penetration
of the boundary of the country, projected from the units of a hostile fleet, was in the circumstances
of total war a military operation, and their capture, followed by their surrender to the military arm
of the government, was a continuance of the same operation." CORWIN, supra note 54, at 120.
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organizations or persons." 96 In this Resolution, Congress studiously
avoided use of the word "war." Representative Conyers, for example,
stated that "[b]y not declaring war, the resolution preserves our precious
civil liberties" and that "[t]his is important because declarations of war
trigger broad statutes that not only criminalize interference with troops and
recruitment but also authorize the President to apprehend 'alien
enemies."' 97 But the Order, unlike Congress's Resolution, in no way
confines its reach to those involved in the September 11 attacks: It
explicitly asserts the power to try any "international terroris[t]" anywhere
in the world.98 No matter how broadly the statutes and precedents are
stretched, there is no constitutional warrant for expanding the military
tribunals' authority in just the way Congress refused to expand presidential
power-to cover individuals completely unconnected to the September 11
attacks.
Second, there was a pair of statutes (Articles 81 and 82) explicitly
authorizing trial by military commission for spying and providing aid to the
enemy in Quirin, and the eight defendants were tried for, among other
things, these violations. By contrast, the Order promulgated by President
Bush, and the legal claims he has made about the commander-in-chief
power, are in no way tethered to any similarly explicit legislative
authorization. Rather, the President's Order extends the range of offenses
that it makes subject to military tribunals to include "any and all offenses
triable by military commission" -not just acts of unlawful combatants that
96. The Resolution states:
[Tihe President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or
aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such
organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism
against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.
Joint Resolution: To Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against Those
Responsible for the Recent Attacks Launched Against the United States, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115
Stat. 224, 224 (2001).
Congress intentionally rejected proposed White House language that would have authorized
the use of force against all nations that harbor terrorists, whether or not connected to
September 11. See John Lancaster & Helen Dewar, Congress Clears Use of Force, $40 Billion in
Emergency Aid, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 2001, at A4; see also 147 CONG. REC. S9949 (daily ed.
Oct. 1, 2001) (statement of Sen. Byrd) (" [T]he use of force authority granted to the President
extends only to the perpetrators of the September 11 attack. It was not the intent of Congress to
give the President unbridled authority.., to wage war against terrorism writ large ...."); id. at
S9951 (statement of Sen. Levin) (making a similar point). The proposed White House resolution
evidently stated that the President was authorized to use force not only against those countries and
entities responsible for the September 11 attacks, but also "to deter and pre-empt any future acts
of terrorism or aggression against the United States." 147 CONG. REC. S9951 (daily ed. Oct. 1,
2001) (reprinting the text of the proposed White House resolution).
97. 147 CONG. REC. H5638, H5680 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 2001) (statement of Rep. Conyers);
see also id. at H5653 (statement of Rep. Barr) (arguing that "[w]e need a declaration of war"
from Congress to "[g]ive the President the tools, the absolute flexibility he needs").
98. Military Order, supra note 3, § 1(a).
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offend the laws of war, but also "violations of... other applicable laws." 99Unlike the specific laws in Quirin, neither the terrorism statutes on thebooks as of September 11, nor the ones that Congress enacted afterward,
provide for a military trial for acts of terrorism.100
These differences are exacerbated by an important distinction betweenthe Nazi saboteurs and members of al Qaeda. Unlike the status of the eightNazis who abandoned their uniforms, that of al Qaeda members as"unlawful belligerents" is incapable of being ascertained apart from theirultimate guilt of planning and executing acts that massacre unarmedcivilians and thereby violate the laws of war. The result is that anydetermination today, either by the President or by an Article III court onhabeas review, of the jurisdiction of the military tribunals is necessarily
bound up with the merits of the substantive charges against a particulardefendant. At least in Quirin it was possible for the Court to say, from theundisputed fact that it had before it Nazi soldiers who had deliberately
abandoned their military garb to pass unnoticed among the civilianpopulation, that the defendants-being analogous to the spies prosecuted bytribunals at the time of the Founding-had no historically grounded right tothe usual protections of jury trial and the like, even if ultimately innocent ofthe charges against them. The present Order, by contrast, makes thejurisdictional question (whether someone is subject to a military trial at all)the very same one as the question on the merits (whether the person is
guilty of a war crime).'
These distinctions-that Quirin involved a total, declared war, withunlawful belligerents identifiable in terms distinct from the merits and withcharges that were coupled to statutes that explicitly authorized a militarytrial-should be viewed against the backdrop of the language in the opiniongoing out of its way to say that the Court's holding was extremelylimited."0 2 At most, Quirin provides a narrow exception to the general rule
99. Id. §§ I(e), 4(a) (emphasis added).100. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339 (1994) (providing felony punishments for acts of terrorism).101. Even conceding that military tribunals are permissible for the narrow category ofunlawful belligerents, the Order is much too broad. Attorney General Ashcroft has said, forexample, that "members of al Qaeda are unlawful belligerents under the law of war." TerrorismHearings, supra note 47 (statement of John Ashcroft, Attorney General). While it may berelatively easy to demonstrate that an at Qaeda member was present in America without a uniformor identifying mark, it may be harder to prove that such an individual had a "hostile purpose" ofthe type contemplated in Quirin: that of "destroying property used or useful in prosecuting thewar... [or] directed at the destruction of enemy war supplies and the implements of theirproduction and transportation, quite as much as at the armed forces." Expare Quirin, 317 U.S. 1,37(1942).
102. The Court said that it had "no occasion now to define with meticulous care the ultimateboundaries of the jurisdiction of military tribunals" and that "[w]e hold only that those particularacts constitute an offense against the law of war which the Constitution authorizes to be tried bymilitary commission." Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45-46. Indeed, Quirin recognized that the use oftribunals may be conditioned by the Sixth Amendment. See id. at 29 (assuming that some offensesagainst the law of war are "constitutionally triable only by ajury," as Milligan held).
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announced in the earlier Milligan case, which found congressional
authorization to be a necessary, although by no means sufficient,
requirement."0 3
As we have noted, however, Quirin relied upon a third congressional
act to show Congress's assent: the aforementioned Article 15 of the Articles
of War. Unlike the first two forms of authorization, which are not
applicable to justify President Bush's Order, Article 15 continues in force
today without material change as 10 U.S.C. § 821, part of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).' ° The strongest case for the current
Order's statutory authorization, therefore, is not the point made by
President Bush, that President Roosevelt used military tribunals to try
unlawful belligerents in World War II, but rather that § 821, whose broad
language might appear to recognize only the concurrent jurisdiction of
military commissions, was authoritatively interpreted in Quirin as an
affirmative authorization and therefore furnishes a statutory precedent
triggered by Congress's Use-of-Force Resolution.°
5
We have already explained why we believe this argument moves far too
quickly given the distinctive facts of Quirin.6 The argument also ignores
103. Quirin insisted that the Milligan majority's dictum that not even Congress had power to
establish military tribunals when civilian courts were open applied only to a defendant who, like
Milligan but unlike the Nazi saboteurs, had not been "a part of or associated with the armed
forces of the enemy," had never even "been a resident [and thus a citizen] of any of the states" at
war with the Union, and hence "was a non-belligerent, not subject to the law of war." Id at 45.
But the Quirin implication that Congress might well have constitutional power to establish
military tribunals even where civilian courts were available to try unlawful enemy belligerents-
who, like the Nazi saboteurs (and seemingly the al Qaeda terrorists), had indeed been members of
an enemy armed force before going under cover to attack American targets-never went so far as
to suggest that the President might have the power to create such tribunals for unlawful enemy
belligerents on his own, even after a declaration of war and, a fortiori, without any such
declaration. See supra note 87 (discussing Quirin's express disclaimer regarding unilateral
presidential authority). And language in Milligan-language whose reach the Quirin Court said
nothing to question or restrict-highlighted the fact that the nineteenth-century Congress had
vested civilian courts with jurisdiction to try the precise offenses of which Milligan stood accused.
Milligan evidently read Congress's silence about whether such charges could be tried in military
tribunals to constitute a lack of the requisite affirmative authorization. See Milligan, 71 U.S. at
122 (" Why was he not delivered to the Circuit Court of Indiana to be proceeded against according
to law? No reason of necessity could be urged against it; because Congress had declared penalties
against the offences charged, provided for their punishment, and directed that court to hear and
determine them.").
104. See 10 U.S.C. § 821 (1994).
105. See Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 251 (1998) (stating that "'[c]onsiderations of
stare decisis have special force in the area of statutory interpretation"' (citation omitted));
Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978) ("Congress is presumed to be aware of an
administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-
enacts a statute without change."); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405-06
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (outlining why heightened rules of stare decisis apply in statutory
settings); I TRIBE, supra note 64, §§ 1-16, 3-3, at 84 & n.42, 251-54.
106. See Michael A. Newton, Continuum Crimes: Military Jurisdiction over Foreign
Nationals Who Commit International Crimes, 153 MIL. L. REv. I, 88 n.413 (1996) (stating that
neither "the history of military tribunals in United States jurisprudence [nor] the rules of
international law warrant such a broad and ambiguous interpretation of the phrase" and that the
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independent evidence that § 821 did not absorb constructions its
predecessor, Article 15, had been given during declared wars: When the
UCMJ was codified in 1950, Congress deleted the words "in time of war"
from another provision, Article of War 78, to make clear that that
provision, evidently in contrast to such others as Article 15, permitted a
court-martial to impose death or other punishment for certain forms of
trespass in circumstances "amounting to a state of belligerency, but where a
formal state of war does not exist." 07
In general, the UCMJ has been read narrowly to avoid military trials, in
the absence of a formal declaration of war, of those who do not serve in our
armed forces. For example, when a civilian employee of the Army was
charged with criminal violations in Vietnam and tried by court-martial, the
United States Court of Military Appeals decided that, in determining the
applicability of the UCMJ, "the words 'in time of war' mean... a war
formally declared by Congress." ' The court believed that "a strict and
literal construction of the phrase 'in time of war' should" confine the
jurisdiction of military courts."0 9
"better approach... is for Congress to amend [§ 82 ] and make the jurisdictional basis absolutely
clear to both potential criminals and their defense attorneys"). It is also notable that some of the
main proponents of military tribunals for terrorists have suggested that affirmative congressional
authorization is necessary. See Spencer J. Crona & Neal A. Richardson, Justice for War Criminals
of Invisible Armies: A New Legal and Military Approach to Terrorism, 21 OKLA. CrrY U. L. REV.
349, 398-99 (1996) (stating that the tension between Quirin and Milligan "can be resolved simply
by Congress declaring terrorism to be a form of unlawful belligerency, from which ordinary law
no longer secures either public safety or private rights, and further declaring terrorists to be enemy
armed forces").
107. Hearings on H.R. 2498 Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Armed Services,
81st Cong. 1229 (1949).
108. United States v. Averette, 19 C.M.A. 363, 365 (1970) (emphasis added). The same court
followed this line of reasoning in Zamora v. Woodson, 19 C.M.A. 403 (1970), holding that the
term "in time of war" means "a war formally declared by Congress," and that the military effort
in Vietnam could not qualify as such. Id. at 404; see also Robb v. United States, 456 F.2d 768,
771 (Ct. CI. 1972) (holding that "short of a declared war," a court-martial did not possess
jurisdiction over a civilian employee of the Armed Forces).
In a rather different setting during the Korean War, the military courts have found that a
special court-martial had jurisdiction over a substantive offense by a soldier, that of sleeping at
one's post during time of war. United States v. Bancroft, 3 C.M.A. 3 (1953). The court pointed to
many indicia of a wartime situation, including special "national emergency legislation." Id at 5;
see also United States v. Ayers, 4 C.M.A. 220 (1954) (following Bancroft). While members of our
military might be subject to additional punishment based on statutes that aggravate penalties
during wartime, to apply the jurisdiction of the UCMJ to those not ordinarily subject to it requires
an affirmative act of Congress. As the Averette court wrote:
We emphasize our awareness that the fighting in Vietnam qualifies as a war as that
word is generally used and understood. By almost any standard of comparison-the
number of persons involved, the level of casualties, the ferocity of the combat, the
extent of the suffering, and the impact on our nation-the Vietnamese armed conflict is
a major military action. But such a recognition should not serve as a shortcut for a
formal declaration of war, at least in the sensitive area of subjecting civilians to military
jurisdiction.
Averette, 19 C.M.A. at 365-66.
109. Averene, 19 C.M.A. at 365.
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The UCMJ's term "in a time of war" thus requires a congressionally
declared war to provide jurisdiction over civilians for courts-martial or
military tribunals. This strict reading provides an answer to those who treat
Quirin as giving a definitive gloss to § 821, for it explains why the Court's
"in time of war" language should be read narrowly.
l Standard "clear
statement" principles-that if the legislature wants to curtail a
constitutional right, it should say so clearly or its legislation will be
construed to avoid the constitutional difficulty-support this strict
reading."' Without a clear statement by this Congress about the need for
military tribunals," l' it will be difficult for a civilian court, on habeas
110. E.g., Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1942) (relying on the fact that tribunals were
used "in time of war"); see also Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 348-49 (1952) (using a similar
formulation).
11l. E.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129-30 (1958) (holding that the Secretary of State
could not deny passports on the basis of Communist Party membership without a clear delegation
from Congress, and that this permission could not be "silently granted' (emphasis added)); see
also Valentine v. United States ex rel Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 9 (1936) (preventing an extradition
where the treaty did not provide for it, out of a concern for liberty, stating that "the Constitution
creates no executive prerogative to dispose of the liberty of the individual. Proceedings against [an
individual] must be authorized by law.... [Tihe legal authority does not exist save as it is given
by an act of Congress"). Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668-69 (1981), applied a looser
definition of "implied authorization from Congress," but did not find that lack of congressional
voice would constitute implicit authorization. See I TRIBE, supra note 64, § 4-7, at 674-75. In
Dames & Moore, a case in which a constitutional right was probably not at stake in any event, see
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9-7, at 612-13 (2d ed, 1988), the
Court approved an executive order that terminated all litigation between United States nationals
and Iran in return for the establishment of a claims tribunal to arbitrate the disputes. See I TRIBE,
supra note 64, § 4-7, at 674-75. The Court did not find explicit authorization by Congress to
extinguish pending claims but grounded a finding of implied authorization in Congress's passage
of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, which approved a different executive claims
settlement action and provided a procedure to implement future settlement agreements. See
Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 680. Even so, Dames & Moore provides little support for the
Military Order. In the current case, Congress has passed no such legislation that recognizes or
ratifies the President's authority to convene military tribunals without a declaration of war, and,
unlike the questionable property right at issue in Dames & Moore, the constitutional rights now at
stake-life and liberty-are anything but dubious. As such, Congress's implicit approval cannot
be found here as it was (perhaps questionably) in Dames & Moore. And in any event, the Dames
& Moore decision expressly disclaimed attempts to use its precedent in very different cases: "We
attempt to lay down no general 'guidelines' covering other situations not involved here, and
attempt to confine the opinion only to the very questions necessary to decision of the case." Id. at
661.
112. Even the freedoms of speech and the press may be contingent at times on congressional
authorization to curtail them when national security is at stake. In New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), the Court, in a per curiam opinion, denied the President an injunction
to block the New York Times and the Washington Post from publishing certain documents which
the administration claimed would damage the military effort in Vietnam. Justice Black observed:
The Government does not even attempt to rely on any act of Congress. Instead it makes
the bold and dangerously far-reaching contention that the courts should take it upon
themselves to "make" a law abridging freedom of the press... even when the
representatives of the people in Congress have adhered to the command of the First
Amendment and refused to make such a law.
Id. at 718 (Black, J., concurring). Justice Marshall observed that Congress had considered
legislation that would have made such disclosure criminal and "[i]f the proposal... had been
enacted, the publication of the documents involved here would certainly have been a crime." Id.
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review, to assess the exigencies of the situation and to determine whether
the circumstances truly justify dispensing with jury trials, grand juries, and
the rules of evidence.' 1
3
Indeed, if the UCMJ were stretched to give the President the power to
create the tribunals purportedly authorized by this Order, then it would risk
making the statute an unconstitutional delegation of power.14 Such an
interpretation would leave the President free to define a "time of war,"
grant him the discretion to set up military tribunals at will, bestow upon him
the power to prosecute whomever he selects in a military tribunal, vest him
with the authority to label something an offense and to try an offender for
it, give him the power to try those cases before military judges that serve as
part of the executive branch, and perhaps even empower him to dispense
with habeas corpus review by an Article III court.
Finally, to the extent that Quirin did provide the President with broad
authority in interpreting Article of War 15, there are reasons to discount the
case itself as statutory precedent. After all, just two years after Quirin, the
same Supreme Court upheld government orders that imposed severe
curtailments of liberty on Japanese Americans during World War 1I in the
infamous Korematsu case." 5  Justice Frankfurter, with characteristic
at 747 (Marshall, J., concurring); see also id. at 740 (White, J., concurring) (noting that Congress
"ha[d] not, however, authorized the injunctive remedy against threatened publication"). Justice
White's reluctance to defer to the executive, "[alt least in the absence of legislation by Congress,"
id. at 732 (White, J., concurring), was echoed by Justice Douglas's indication that the case might
have been different with specific congressional authorization or a declaration of war, id. at 722
(Douglas, J., concurring); see also supra note 61; cf. DAVID RUDENSTINE, THE DAY THE PRESSES
STOPPED 106 (1996) (quoting Alexander Bickel's argument in the case that "any plausible
conception of the separation of powers doctrine barred the government from suing the Times ....
[T]he suit could go forward only if Congress had passed a statute authorizing it").
113. While some war powers, such as rights of prize, have been found to exist even when
Congress has not formally declared war, in such cases individual rights were not as severely
threatened, and Congress had spoken. See, e.g., Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dal.) 37, 39 (1800)
(opinion of Moore, J.) (stating that the " case depends on the construction of the act" providing for
taking "enemy" ships); id. at 42 (opinion of Washington, J.) (examining "the true construction of
the act" and "evidence of legislative will"); id. at 44-45 (opinion of Chase, J.) (analyzing the
"acts of congress... to show" that Congress intended France to be an "enemy" under the
relevant Acts); id. at 46 (opinion of Paterson, J.) (making a similar point).
114. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 449-53 (1998) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 545 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 687 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring); Cal. Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 91-93 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
see also I TRIBE, supra note 64, § 5-19, at 977-1011. But see Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns,
531 U.S. 457 (2001) (finding no violation of the nondelegation doctrine); Loving v. United States,
517 U.S. 748 (1996).
115. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). The Korematsu decision did not
"decide the serious constitutional issues.., when an assembly or relocation order is applied or is
certain to be applied" but instead only upheld the order excluding Fred Korematsu from a
"military area." Id. at 222; see also Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 308-10 (1944) (Roberts, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (stating that in Endo, as in Korematsu, the Court should have decided
the constitutionality of the detention program).
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understatement, called Quirin "not a happy precedent."
' 6 As David
Danelski has shown, a principal reason for authorization of these military
tribunals was the government's wish to cover up the evidence of the FBI's
bungling of the case.117 And it also appears that some highly questionable
ex parte arm-twisting by the executive may have spurred the Supreme
Court's unanimous decision."' Despite the Court's sometime-adherence to
a strong stare decisis rule for its own prior legislative interpretations, the
Court does at times overrule them-over eighty times in twenty-seven
years, according to one incisive analysis." 9 Quirin plainly fits the criteria
typically offered for judicial confinement or reconsideration: It was a
decision rendered under extreme time pressure,
2 ' with respect to which
there are virtually no reliance interests at stake,
2' and where the statute
itself has constitutional dimensions suggesting that its construction should
be guided by relevant developments in constitutional law.
122
Indeed, despite a strong statutory precedent, when the Governor of
Hawaii and President Roosevelt created military tribunals in Hawaii in the
wake of the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the Supreme Court in Duncan v.
Kahanamoku struck them down. 123 An Act of Congress called the Organic
Act permitted the Governor of Hawaii, with the concurrence of the
President, to declare "martial law" when the public safety required it, but
the Court construed the Organic Act not to permit military tribunals for the
116. Danelski, supro note 80, at 80 (quoting a memorandum from Justice Frankfurter).
117. id. at65-68.
118. See HOWARD BALL & PHILLIP J. COOPER, OF POWER AND RIGHT: HUGO BLACK,
WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, AND AMERICA'S CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 118 (1992) (quoting
WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS, 1939-1975 (1980)).
119. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1363
(1988); see also, e.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 672 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); 1 TRIBE, supra note 64, § 3-3, at 252-53 (detailing the factors considered and the
justifications provided when the Court decides to overrule statutory precedents). There are good
reasons, generally speaking, to weigh statutory precedents less heavily than the conventional
wisdom might suggest. See Eskridge, supra, at 1403-08 (describing why Congress might not be
able to correct a judicial error and outlining other reasons).
120. Justice Frankfurter argued:
[Tihe relevant demands of stare decisis do not preclude considering, for the first time
thoroughly and in the light of the best available evidence of congressional purpose, a
statutory interpretation which started as an unexamined assumption on the basis of
inapplicable citations and has the claim of a dogma solely through reiteration.
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 220-21 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
121. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (noting that, when
reexamining a prior holding, the Court considers, among other things, "whether the rule is subject
to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add
inequity to the cost of repudiation" ).
122. See, e.g., Monroe, 365 U.S. at 221-22 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Eskridge, supra note
119, at 1376 & n.78 (arguing that this "exception helps explain many of the Court's overrulings
of statutory precedents" and providing a useful list of examples). Contemporary congressional
authorization is particularly needed for the military tribunals in the present circumstances, given
how the Constitution's interpretation has evolved since World War II. See Katyal, supra note 41,
at 1346-59 (discussing how Congress can "update" constitutional guarantees).
123. 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
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trial of garden-variety offenses coming within the jurisdiction of the civilian
courts, even though Hawaii was "under fire" and a "battle field." 124 The
Court reached this conclusion in the face of a powerful statutory precedent
to the contrary: The Hawaii Constitution had a similar martial-law
provision that its supreme court had construed to permit the Governor to
create military tribunals, and Congress had enacted the Organic Act
following the state court decision. 25 The Court found the argument from
statutory precedent to be unconvincing. Reasoning that Congress "did not
specifically state" or "explicitly declare" that the military could close the
civil courts, 26 the Court construed Congress's statute in light of "our
political traditions and our institutions of jury trials in courts of law"-
traditions that "can hardly suffice to persuade us that Congress was willing
to enact a Hawaiian supreme court decision permitting such a radical
departure from our steadfast beliefs." 127 Instead, the Justices wrapped
themselves firmly in the language of Milligan:
[The Founders] were opposed to governments that placed in the
hands of one man the power to make, interpret and enforce the
laws. Their philosophy has been the people's throughout our
history. For that reason we have maintained legislatures chosen by
citizens or their representatives and courts and juries to try those
who violate legislative enactments. We have always been
especially concerned about the potential evils of summary criminal
trials and have guarded against them by provisions embodied in the
constitution itself. See Ex parte Milligan. Legislatures and courts
are not merely cherished American institutions; they are
indispensable to our Government ....
... [T]he only [other] time this Court had ever discussed the
supplanting of courts by military tribunals in a situation other than
that involving the establishment of a military government over
recently occupied enemy territory, it had emphatically declared that"civil liberty and this kind of martial law cannot endure together;
the antagonism is irreconcilable; and, in the conflict, one or the
other must perish." Ex parte Milligan. 28
To be sure, Duncan involved a circumstance in which civilian law was
replaced wholesale by military rule, not one in which military rule was
made applicable solely to unlawful belligerents. Nevertheless, the case
124. Id. at 344 (Burton, J., dissenting).
125. See id. at 316 (majority opinion) (rejecting the government's argument that "[w]hen
Congress passed the Organic Act it simply enacted the applicable language of the Hawaiian
Constitution and with it the interpretation of that language by the Hawaiian supreme court").
126. Id. at 315.
127. Id. at 317.
128. Id. at 322, 324 (citations omitted).
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makes clear that, under the Milligan principle, when military tribunals are
substituted for available civil alternatives, specific authorization is
necessary even when Congress has supposedly codified judicial precedent
purporting to discern authority in preexisting statutes.
4. The Constitutionally Stronger Case of Military Trials
in Conquered Territory
While the prospect of military tribunals that can try, in America,
virtually any act of terrorism strays far beyond any extant statutory
authorization and falls well outside the powers of the President as
Commander in Chief and well beyond the penumbra of his full powers, the
possibility of military tribunals functioning abroad presents a stronger case,
for at least three reasons. First, the Constitution gives the President far
wider latitude when he is acting abroad in his military capacity. Second, for
those who regard the Constitution as having little or no force overseas, the
use of tribunals abroad will, of course, seem less problematic.'29 And third,
in a theatre of war abroad there may be an immediate military need for the
adjudication of guilt or innocence that the civilian federal courts are
unavailable to meet.
130
While the defenders of the Military Order seem thus far not to have
mentioned it, there is in fact an entire line of Supreme Court cases
permitting the use of military tribunals for the full panoply of offenses
when enemy territory is taken and our civilian courts do not furnish an
129. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990) (describing how
the text of the Fourth Amendment, unlike the texts of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, secures
only rights of "the people," itself a term that seemingly precludes extraterritorial application); id.
at 268-69 (describing precedent with respect to the Insular Cases, such as Balzac v. Porto Rico,
258 U.S. 298 (1922)); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 784-85 (1950) (expressing serious
doubts about the extraterritorial application of the Constitution to "enemy elements"). Several
Justices, however, have suggested that parts of the Constitution do have extraterritorial reach. See,
e.g., Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 281-85 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that government
action abroad can have a sufficient nexus with domestic action to justify extraterritorial
application); Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 152 (1953) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (observing that
Quirin's ruling that "military tribunals are not governed by the procedure for trials prescribed in
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments" does not entail the proposition "that all the rights covered by
the Fifth and the Sixth Amendments were abrogated by Art. I, § 8, cl. 14 of the Constitution,
empowering Congress to make rules for the armed forces," for it is "plain from the text of the
Fifth Amendment that that position is untenable," and the Court has "never... held" otherwise);
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 797-98 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Constitution does apply extraterritorially).
130. There may be circumstances in which this third reason, as its obvious derivation from
Milligan suggests, is applicable domestically as well. For example, on this rationale military
tribunals might have been appropriate in at least part of New York City in the days immediately
following the World Trade Center attacks, when Foley Square was closed and the Southern
District of New York was not fully operating. Such tribunals could not be used in other areas,
however, and would have had to cease operating in New York City once the federal courts
became operational.
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available option. For example, the Supreme Court in Madsen v. Kinsella
permitted a military commission to try for murder the dependent wife of an
American serviceman in Germany following World War I.' The Madsen
Court mentioned an earlier case, decided by a provisional federal court in
Louisiana during the Civil War, in which that tribunal declared itself
competent to hear cases unrelated to the war (involving a man's alleged
murder of his wife and another man's arson of a building), despite the fact
that the court was put into existence by Executive Order of President
Lincoln.'32 Both in this Civil War decision and in Madsen, however, no
regularly constituted American courts existed in the relevant venues, and
the executive tribunals were deemed necessary to secure order during the
United States's occupation of formerly enemy territory.133 These cases thus
131. Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952). Madsen contained broad language about
Article 15 of the Articles of War, reading it to establish that " Congress has not deprived [military]
commissions or tribunals of the existing jurisdiction which they had over such offenders and
offenses." Id. at 351-52. But that judicial language, which could (but need not) permit
congressional silence to constitute assent, must be construed in light of the fact that the trial in
Madsen occurred outside the United States following a declared war, and in circumstances in
which enemy territory was conquered and there was a need for some sort of legal authority.
Indeed, Madsen stated that military commissions "have been constitutionally recognized agencies
for meeting many urgent governmental responsibilities related to war," id. at 346, and noted that
these tribunals derive their authority from Congress's power to declare war, id. at 346 n.9 (quoting
WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 831 (2d ed. 1920)), and from the
occupation of Germany and the recent "cessation of hostilities" after a "time of war," id. at 348.
132. United States v. Reiter, 27 F. Cas. 768 (1865) (No. 16,146), discussed in Madsen, 343
U.S. at 347 n.9, 360 n.25. There were two acts of Congress that appeared to grant the President
the power to establish military tribunals, and Lincoln had invoked them both in the Milligan case,
but the provisional court did not mention them. The first, the Act of February 28, 1795, provided:
[W]henever the laws of the United States shall be opposed, or the execution thereof
obstructed, in any state, by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary
course of judicial proceedings .... it shall be lawful for the President of the United
States, to call forth the militia... to suppress such combinations, and to cause the laws
to be duly executed.
Act of Feb. 28, 1795, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 424, 424 (current version at 10 U.S.C. § 332 (1994)). The
second, the Act of March 3, 1807, stated:
[I]n all cases of insurrection, or obstruction to the laws ... where it is lawful for the
President of the United States to call forth the militia for the purpose of suppressing
such insurrection, or of causing the laws to be duly executed, it shall be lawful for him
to employ, for the same purposes, such part of the land or naval force of the United
States, as shall be judged necessary ....
Act of Mar. 3, 1807, ch. 39, 2 Stat. 443, 443 (current version at 10 U.S.C. § 331).
133. Madsen, 343 U.S. at 345 n.7 ("There was no nonmilitary court of the United States in
Germany."); id. at 356-60 (describing need for military tribunals in Germany given the absence of
civilian authority); Reiter, 27 F. Cas. at 771 (stating that President Lincoln's courts "were the only
institutions found there at the time the military authority of the United States was by force of its
arms established there" and that "[n]o country can exist without a government of some kind...
[because] order must be preserved and security to person and estate assured"). Reiter went on to
state that, if Louisiana was to be called "domestic" land, as opposed to being "deemed foreign
territory," then the President could be without power to establish such tribunals. Reiter, 27 F. Cas.
at 775. Indeed, President Lincoln's Order itself recognized the distinction between assuring
punishment for past acts and preserving order and selected the latter rationale, stating that the
Civil War had "temporarily subverted and swept away the civil institutions of [Louisiana],
including the judiciary and the judicial authorities of the Union," so it was "indispensably
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affirmed a long-standing rule about rights of conquest in places where
civilian justice was unavailable, for in those circumstances the same power
the President exercised in subjecting territory to the military domination of
the United States entailed an ancillary power to create tribunals to secure
order there."3 These cases thus provide some limited support for military
tribunals that operate abroad, although in doing so they also reaffirm the
core proposition of Milligan.'5
The problem today, however, is that the United States does not claim
that it has conquered territory or that it is the source of order in Afghanistan
or elsewhere abroad. Instead, it has helped to create an indigenous interim
government in Afghanistan. Furthermore, while this is perhaps not fatal, the
Order differs from the circumstances in Madsen in that it focuses on
punishing the perpetrators of past acts rather than on providing order
prospectively in conquered territory.
5. The Possibility of Legislative Revision
The President's legal claim-reflecting an ambitious stretching of the
Commander-in-Chief Clause, a dramatic disregard of Youngstown in the
name of homeland security, and a risky overreading of Quirin-thus sets a
novel and dangerous course. Following a logic not easy to distinguish from
that needed to square President Bush's Order with the Constitution, a future
president might unilaterally declare that America is engaged in a "War on
Drugs"-with some justification given the annual death toll from
necessary that there shall be some judicial tribunal existing there capable of administering
justice." Id. at 770.
134. See Mechs.' & Traders' Bank v. Union Bank, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 276, 296 (1874)
(holding that "the power to establish by military authority courts for the administration of civil as
well as criminal justice in portions of the insurgent States occupied by the National forces, is
precisely the same as that which exists when foreign territory has been conquered and is occupied
by the conquerors"); The Grapeshot, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 129, 132-33 (1869). In the latter case, the
Court stated:
[lit became the duty of the National government, wherever the insurgent power was
overthrown, ... to provide as far as possible, so long as the war continued, for the
security of persons and property and for the administration of justice .... We have no
doubt that the Provisional Court of Louisiana was propcrly established by the President
in the exercise of his constitutional authority during war; or that Congress had power,
upon the close of the war, and the dissolution of the Provisional Court, to provide for
the transfer of cases pending in that court, and of its judgments and decrees, to the
proper courts of the United States.
The Grapeshot, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) at 132-33.
135. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 35 nn.62-63 (1957) (stating that Madsen was not
"controlling" in a case involving the military trials of dependent wives of American servicemen
abroad in times of peace because Madsen "concerned trials in enemy territory which had been
conquered and held by force" and that in "such areas the Army commander can establish military
or civilian commissions as an arm of the occupation to try everyone in the occupied area, whether
they are connected with the Army or not" and quoting Milligan's formulation that the
Constitution "is a law... equally in war and peace").
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narcoterrorism-and decide to subject certain narcotics traffickers to
military trials in tribunals of his own creation. 136 Imagine another president
who sees the private possession of guns as an outrage rather than a right.
That president might proclaim that, because handguns and rifles kill
thousands of Americans a year, military tribunals are necessary to try
dealers in (and perhaps even buyers of) illegal guns, particularly those who
ship such firearms from abroad.'37 These examples may seem far afield, but
they represent smaller steps, in legal logic if not in political plausibility,
than the one the administration has had to take in moving from what
previous administrations have done (the Nazi saboteurs, the Civil War
tribunals) to what President Bush claims authority to do today. 3 ' And, of
course, the very precedent the President seeks to revitalize, Quirin,
explicitly permits military tribunals to be used against American citizens
who are "unlawful belligerents" within our own borders.' We must be
extraordinarily careful when revitalizing an old and troubling court decision
in this way, for doing so will set new precedent for future presidents."
136. Indeed, recent modifications to the Posse Comitatus Act-an Act passed to prevent the
military from becoming part of civilian affairs in the wake of the martial law of the Civil War-
suggest precisely this possibility. See 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1994) ("Whoever, except in cases and
under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses
any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both."). That cornerstone
statute reflects an underlying presumption against blurring military and civilian life unless
Congress clearly authorizes otherwise or the Constitution so demands, but it has been modified
recently with respect to narcotics and immigration laws. Department of Defense Authorization
Act, Pub. L. No. 97-86, § 905, 95 Stat. 1099, 1114-16 (1982) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C.
§§ 371-380) (authorizing the Secretary of Defense to furnish equipment and personnel to assist
civilian agencies in enforcing drug and immigration laws, but preventing the military, with the
exception of the Coast Guard, from conducting "a search and seizure, an arrest, or other similar
activity").
137. Consider also the following statement, made in the context of the international
enslavement of women through forced prostitution: "The United States has declared war on
organized crime figures who rape and exploit women." 147 CONG. REc. H91 11 (daily ed. Dec.
11, 2001) (statement of Rep. Smith).
138. There is, to be sure, a clear difference between trying and punishing drug dealers who
kill, and waging a war against an international organization that has itself declared war on the
United States; has vowed to kill our citizens wherever it might find them; and has launched a
devastating attack on a major city and against the center of our defense establishment. Just as
Kristallnacht went beyond the crime of breaking Jewish shopkeepers' windows precisely because
it was part of a systematic assault on the Jewish people, so the recent terrorist attacks differ even
from the killings associated with narcoterrorism and firearms because they are part of a lethal
jihad against the American people. Even so, giving the President the ability to decide on his own
what constitutes a "war" and to constitute his own tribunals to adjudicate the guilt of those who
are said to have launched illegal warfare against us-authority that President Bush evidently
claims-could well set a dangerous precedent, particularly because today's lack of a formal
declaration of war is exacerbated by the lack of a well-defined enemy nation to defeat and by
circumstances in which there cannot be anything like an authoritative victory marked by an act of
surrender and followed by terms of peace.
139. Exparre Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 37-38 (1942).
140. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 79 (1945) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). Justice Rutledge
wrote:
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
1296 [Vol. 111: 1259
Military Tribunals
For these reasons, the possibility that Congress might supersede the
President's Order with legislation of its own even before anyone is
convicted by no means renders the Order, and the claim underlying it,
harmless. Because the executive branch has acted ultra vires in even issuing
the Order, the Order lacks the constitutional basis necessary to survive
separation-of-powers scrutiny.'4 ' The fact that President Truman's
Executive Order to seize the steel mills, an order jeopardizing little beyond
property, could have been promptly reversed by Congress (a possibility
explicitly invoked by President Truman, who-unlike President Bush-sent
messages to Congress stating that he would abide by a legislative
determination to overrule his Executive Order), was deemed irrelevant by
the Steel Seizure Court.
42
In any event, President Bush's very issuance of the Order has indelibly
altered the status quo, creating numerous barriers to congressional reversal
if and when Congress might be inclined to act: Military trials might by then
be underway, in which case a congressional reversal might create double
jeopardy problems; or Congress might simply be disinclined to set up a
dangerous confrontation between the branches in a time of crisis. Moreover,
reversal by Congress would require not a simple majority but a two-thirds
vote (because of presidential power to veto the legislation proposing the
reversal), so that requiring Congress to reverse the executive decision
would significantly shift power from Congress to the President. A future
president could set up military tribunals in a crisis-say, the "War on
Drugs" tribunals we have posited for narcotics traffickers-and essentially
dare Congress to attain that two-thirds majority. The separation of powers is
designed precisely to guard against such transfers of constitutional
authority.
Not heretofore has it been held that any human being is beyond [the Fifth
Amendment's] universally protecting spread in the guaranty of a fair trial in the most
fundamental sense. That door is dangerous to open. I will have no part in opening it.
For once it is ajar, even for enemy belligerents, it can be pushed back wider for others,
perhaps ultimately for all.
Id.
141. If President Clinton during a budget deadlock in his administration had grown frustrated
and had decided to proclaim his budget proposal the law of the land, directing his Secretary of the
Treasury to begin disbursements, Congress would of course have had the power to trump that
"budget" at once with one of its own, but the existence of such trumping power would not have
sufficed to make the President's initial action constitutional.
142. The Court so held, over the dissenters' contrary view. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 676-77 (1952) (Vinson, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Truman's first message
to Congress that "[iut may be that the Congress will deem some other course to be wiser .... I do
not believe the Congress will favor any of these courses of action, but that is a matter for the
Congress to determine," and his second message that "[tihe Congress can, if it wishes, reject the
course of action I have followed in this matter").
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D. Three Post-Quirin Reasons for Further Congressional Involvement
1. Equality
Unlike Quirin, where President Roosevelt applied the tribunals
symmetrically to the saboteurs who claimed to be American citizens and
those who were indisputably German nationals, President Bush's Military
Order singles out aliens for this special disfavor. The Administration and
other defenders of this Order invoke the sparing of United States citizens in
defense of the Order, but that very asymmetry seems to us one of its
constitutional defects. To our knowledge, the Military Order is the first of
its kind to make this sort of citizen/alien distinction. There are two equal
protection problems here. The first concerns treatment of persons in the
United States: Why should a hacker from Montana who launches a
computer virus that infects terminals in hospitals and government facilities
be subject to trial in a military tribunal if he is a green-card holder,1 43 but
accorded a civilian trial if he is a citizen, when the relevant provisions of
the Bill of Rights, and the separation of powers, apply without regard to
citizenship? The second problem concerns treatment abroad: Why should
the government treat American citizens captured fighting with al Qaeda or
with the Taliban against American forces more favorably than native
Afghanis who believe they are fighting to protect their country against
invaders?' For reasons we explain in a moment, the first problem poses a
more serious difficulty than does the second.
The Framers of the Equal Protection Clause understood that
discrimination against aliens was pervasive and problematic and
intentionally extended the reach of the Clause to "persons," rather than
confining it to "citizens." "' Foremost in their minds was the language of
143. While the Order does not purport to define what constitutes "international terrorism," a
recent definition of the term by Congress states that it covers "activities that," when two other
conditions are met, "involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the
criminal laws of the United States or of any State." 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (1994), incorporated by
reference in Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required To
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-37, § 802, 115 Stat. 272, 802. The
two other conditions are that the activities "appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian
population" or otherwise influence or affect the conduct of the government, and that the activities
"occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend national
boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished." Id. The Military Order
apparently modifies the first condition to say that the intent to cause adverse effects to the United
States "economy" is enough, see Military Order, supra note 3, § 2(a)(l)(ii). The second condition
would probably be met by someone using the "means" of the Internet-a mechanism that by
definition transcends national boundaries.
144. Because all of the facts about John Walker Lindh have not yet come to light, we do not
mean to discuss his particular circumstances.
145. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886)
("The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not confined to the protection of citizens.").
The language of the Equal Protection Clause, which protects "persons," intentionally differs from
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Dred Scott v. Sandford, which had limited due process guarantees by
framing them as nothing more than the "privileges of the citizen.""' This
language was repeatedly mentioned in the Senate debates on the Fourteenth
Amendment, with the very first draft of the Amendment distinguishing
between persons and citizens: "Congress shall have power to... secure to
all citizens ... the same political rights and privileges; and to all persons in
every State equal protection in the enjoyment of life, liberty, and
property." 14 7 The Amendment's principal author, Representative John
Bingham, asked: "Is it not essential to the unity of the people that the
citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities
of citizens? Is it not essential.., that all persons, whether citizens or
strangers, within this land, shall have equal protection ... ?" 148
Indeed, an important federal statute, originally part of the Voting Rights
Act of 1870 and now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981, appears to forbid
exactly the type of distinction made by the President's Order establishing
military tribunals:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have
the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and
property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every
kind, and to no other.
149
What we have said thus far might seem insufficient to establish that the
President's Order violates either federal statutes or the Constitution. Recent
that of the Privileges or Immunities Clause in the same Amendment, which protects only
"citizens." See John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J.
1385, 1442-47 (1992) (providing evidence that the Equal Protection Clause was intentionally
written as it was specifically in order to extend certain rights to aliens).
146. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 449 (1857). See generally AKHIL REED
AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 170-72 (1998) (tracing the historical origins of the Equal Protection
Clause and its use of the word "persons" to Dred Scott); id. at 217-18 n.* (stating that the Equal
Protection Clause is "paradigmatically" concerned with "nonvoting aliens").
147. AMAR, supra note 146, at 173 (quoting a draft of the Fourteenth Amendment) (emphasis
added).
148. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1090 (1866). Similarly, Senator Howard stated that
the Amendment was necessary to "disable a State from depriving not merely a citizen of the
United States, but any person, whoever he may be, of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law, or from denying to him the equal protection of the laws of the State." ld. at 2765-66.
149. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1994) (emphasis added). The law began as part of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27, but was later modified in 1870 to protect not only
"citizens," but all "persons." See Voting Rights Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 140,
144; Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 369 (stating that the provisions of the Equal Protection Clause "are
universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to
any differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge
of the protection of equal laws," and that the predecessor statute to § 1981 was "accordingly
enacted"); Harrison, supra note 145, at 1442-47 (describing the genesis of § 1981).
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modifications to § 1981 may make it difficult to apply the statute to the
federal government.' 50 As for the constitutional claim, the strong
presumption of "congruence" under which "[e]qual protection analysis in
the Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth
Amendment," 151 has not invariably been applied to federal, as opposed to
state, lines drawn on the basis of citizenship. 5 ' This suggests that the strict
judicial scrutiny to which state classifications based on citizenship are
ordinarily subjected'53 might be inapplicable to the Military Order's stark
discrimination between citizens and aliens.
On closer examination, however, a different conclusion emerges. To
begin with, deferential review of federal distinctions between citizens and
aliens, or between aliens who are nationals of one country and those who
are nationals of another, has its roots in the wide berth accorded the
political branches "in the area of immigration and naturalization,"' 54
particularly when the withholding of such benefits as employment
opportunities from aliens provides a possible bargaining chip in seeking
reciprocal concessions in foreign trade and labor negotiations.'55 When a
categorical preference for American citizens cannot be justified in terms of
immigration and naturalization policy or as an adjunct to our international
150. Before 1991, courts had read § 1981 to apply to the federal government. E.g., Bowers v.
Campbell, 505 F.2d 1155, 1157 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that "section 1981 applies to
employment discrimination by federal officials; it is not confined to state or private action"). In
1991, however, Congress added a new subsection with the following language: "The rights
protected by this section are protected against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and
impairment under color of State law." Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat.
1071, 1072 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981(c)). Accordingly, some courts have found
that § 1981 does not apply to the federal government. E.g., Lee v. Hughes, 145 F.3d 1272, 1277
(I Ith Cir. 1998). The holding in Lee is quite odd, however, for the 1991 language is expansive
rather than restrictive in thrust, and Congress did not delete the word "territory" from the existing
statute. It thus seems plain that Congress did not intend to limit, but only to supplement, existing
civil rights laws by confirming their applicability to nonstate as well as state actors. See La
Compania Ocho, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 874 F. Supp. 1242, 1251 (D.N.M. 1995) (arguing that
the 1991 amendments did not undercut the applicability of § 1981 to the federal government
because the amendments were "intended to expand the scope of civil rights protection, not limit
it"). In any event, § 1981 may make it difficult for states to comply with the Military Order. See
Military Order, supra note 3, § 2(c) (requiring states to turn over "individuallsi subject to this
Order" to the "Secretary of Defense"); id. § 7(d) (defining "state" ).
151. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995) (quoting Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976)); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
152. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 796 (1977); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426
U.S. 88, 102, 104, 114-16 (1976); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81-84 (1976).
153. See, e.g., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973) (finding alienage to be a suspect
classification); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (stating that state "classifications
based on alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to
close judicial scrutiny" and that " [a]liens as a class are a prime example of a 'discrete and insular'
minority" (citations omitted)).
154. Mathews, 426 U.S. at 81-82.
155. See Hampton, 426 U.S. at 104-05, 115 (holding such foreign policy options to be
beyond the mandate of the Civil Service Commission, whose blanket exclusion of all aliens from
the federal civil service was accordingly held to violate Fifth Amendment due process).
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bargaining posture, the basis for relaxing the scrutiny otherwise applicable
to discrimination against aliens as a class evaporates, and the level of
scrutiny becomes correspondingly more searching-as the invalidation of
the Federal Civil Service Commission's attempt to restrict civil service
employment to United States citizens reflects.
5 6 Plainly, subjecting aliens
who are unlawful enemy combatants to military tribunals while
guaranteeing otherwise indistinguishable United States citizens civilian
justice cannot be understood in immigration or international bargaining
terms.
Even more important, the decisions manifesting relaxed rather than
heightened scrutiny of federal discriminations that categorically favor
United States citizens have involved nothing beyond the preferential
availability to our own citizens of government employment or other
socioeconomic benefits that do not touch the raw nerve of equal justice
under law-benefits whose distribution on an unequal basis accordingly
does not trigger strict scrutiny. Crucially, the Military Order curtails rights
that, at least when made available to others similarly situated, have long
been deemed too fundamental to be dispensed with on a merely rational
basis. "'57 If trial by jury, in cases where it is not independently mandatory,
were, for example, made available to those who could afford to pay a
certain fee (to defray the marginal costs to government of actually putting
on a jury trial, protecting jurors, and the like), but not to those too poor to
afford that fee, strict scrutiny, or something very close to it, would be
mandatory,'58 despite the mantra that poverty is not a suspect or even a
semisuspect classification.159
156. Id. at 104, 115.
157. While the Court has not adopted a formula for heightened scrutiny when quasi-
fundamental rights are at stake for quasi-suspect classes, several decisions essentially suggest such
a principle. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221,230 (1982) (stating that, because education
plays a "fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society," a Texas statute denying free
public schooling to children who were not legally admitted into the United States must be justified
by a "substantial" state interest and finding no such justification); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
210-11 n.* (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (suggesting that the cases reveal more than two tiers of
equal protection analysis).
158. See, e.g., M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996) (holding that due process and equal
protection combine to prevent states from limiting appeals from custody-termination decisions to
those parents who can afford record preparation fees); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355
(1963) (deciding similarly that criminal defendants cannot be denied assistance of the appellate
counsel permitted to less indigent defendants because of inability to pay); Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (finding on similar grounds, despite the absence of any constitutional right to
appeal a criminal conviction, that states must provide free trial transcripts on appeal for indigent
defendants when a defendant with resources could purchase such a transcript to facilitate his
appeal).
159. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980) (" [T]his Court has held repeatedly
that poverty, standing alone, is not a suspect classification."); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24 (1973) (rejecting strict scrutiny of Texas's reliance on local property
taxation in school system financing and stating that "where wealth is involved, the Equal
Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages").
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The same follows when rights as basic as the jury trial are dispensed to
citizens but not to aliens who are charged with identical offenses and who
have exactly the same relationship to the very same international terrorist
organizations with which we are at war."6 In short, although we might
afford considerable deference to the President in treating aliens less
favorably than citizens in the distribution of Medicare, social security, or
other similar benefits, or even in matters of employment, there is little or no
room for government by approximation when it puts people on one side or
another of a crude line that makes the difference between giving them
access to the fundamental protections of civilian justice-from indictment
to a jury trial presided over by a judge not answerable to the prosecutor, not
to mention access to an appeal before a tribunal independent of the
prosecuting authority-and relegating them to a distinctly less protective,
and frankly inferior, brand of adjudication. 6' If the President may ever take
such a step, shunting aliens into a procedure from which all U.S. citizens
are spared, he may do so only upon a convincing showing of necessity, one
that matches the claims of threat to the fact of alienage.
It has been well said that "[t]here is no more effective practical
guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that
the principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority must be
imposed generally" and that "nothing opens the door to arbitrary action so
effectively as to allow those officials to pick and choose only a few to
160. This latter point is especially significant, and quite easy to overlook. A situation like that
in Quirin, in which we are at war with a particular nation, is one in which citizens of that nation
who are soldiers (albeit not visibly) of its armed forces are distinguishable in principle from
American citizens who join in their clandestine and hostile effort to injure Americans but are not
members of any enemy nation or other organization with which we are at war. To be sure, the
Quirin Court saw no justification for regarding such citizen turncoats as less eligible for trial by
military tribunals than their noncitizen counterparts. But a distinction in that context between the
two categories of unlawful belligerents would hardly have been irrational. In contrast, in a
situation like the one we confront vis-A-vis al Qaeda, where we are at war with a supranational
terrorist organization drawing support from many nations but being identifiable with none of
them, it seems irrational to distinguish among unlawful belligerents-all of whom are members of
the same terrorist group and with all of whom we are thus at war-on the basis of whether or not
they happen also to be citizens of the United States as opposed to being citizens of, say, Saudi
Arabia, France, or some other nation that may or may not be among the sponsors of terror but
with which we are not, in any event, at war. In other words, it is one thing to give preferential
treatment to U.S. citizens over their alien counterparts when that means giving less favorable
treatment to citizens of a nation with which we are at war (and members of that enemy nation's
military), and quite another thing to give preferential treatment to U.S. citizens when
noncitizenship, rather than being a proxy for membership in the armed forces of the enemy,
simply means that one is merely an unlawful belligerent rather than being a traitor as well-hardly
a reason to be treated more harshly.
161. To be sure, if America is at war with one or more sovereign states, as it was in World
War II with Germany, Japan, and Italy (the now-old "axis" powers), the federal government's
decision to treat citizens of those enemy states in a harsher manner than it treats American
citizens, and indeed even American citizens who might have taken up with the enemy, at least has
a long-standing statutory tradition. See supra text accompanying note 53 (describing the still-
existing Alien Enemy Act of 1798, which authorizes the government to detain and deport
nationals of a nation against which Congress has declared war).
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whom they will apply legislation and thus to escape the political retribution
that might be visited upon them if larger numbers were affected." 162 When
defenders of the line being drawn can, in truth, invoke little beyond the
obvious political convenience of stilling the voices that might otherwise rise
up in protest were American citizens exposed to this distinctly inferior
brand of justice along with their alien counterparts, due process of law
demands more evenhanded treatment by the government. The singling out
of aliens residing in this country for such fundamental disfavor might be
justified in rare circumstances, but it is hard to imagine-and, absent
congressional action, impossible to assume-that such circumstances are
present today.
Somewhat less likely to prove constitutionally vulnerable are trials
outside the United States-for the territorial limits of the Equal Protection
Clause will suggest to many that neither it, nor presumably the embodiment
of its central precepts in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
can invalidate government action abroad. (So too, the words of § 1981 are
confined to "the jurisdiction of the United States" and to "State[s]" and
"Territor[ies]." )163 Nevertheless, pressure for the extraterritorial application
of the Constitution generally is bound to mount as globalization continues
to unfold. Far more than at the Founding, American military and law
enforcement officials have the ability to project their will without regard to
national boundaries, creating a continuous and virtually instantaneous web
of communication between the lowest field officers abroad and their
superiors in Washington, D.C., with the result that legal process served
against those within the United States has the potential to prevent or remedy
actions taken in their name abroad. Even if courts do not revisit precedents
like Verdugo-Urquidez'" in light of such changes, judicial attention to the
links between domestic cause and extraterritorial effect is likely to be
increasingly common. Action by Congress to remedy the equal protection
problems with the Military Order might well avoid what could be a
prematurely broad ruling on extraterritoriality in the context of military
trials.
2. Due Process
The procedural protections of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, as well as the criminal procedure protections of the Fourth,
162. Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring);
see also Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 300 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring)
("Our salvation is the Equal Protection Clause, which requires the democratic majority to accept
for themselves and their loved ones what they impose on you and me.").
163. See supra text accompanying note 149.
164. 494 U.S. 259 (1990); see supra note 129.
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Fifth, and Sixth Amendments, have received far greater attention and
development in the half-century or so after Quirin than in the century and a
half before it. A description of the "due process revolution" is obviously
well beyond the scope of this Essay, but such major shifts in constitutional
law may call into question the Quirin precedent itself, and suggest the need
for greater congressional specificity with respect to military tribunals. For
example, the Supreme Court has held that due process requires certain
procedural protections in many civil matters-including a right to a
hearing' 6 5-and has held that, during custodial interrogations in criminal
cases, certain warnings must be given.'66 We do not believe these decisions
necessarily have full applicability in otherwise constitutional military
tribunals, particularly those operating abroad, but they do suggest that the
constitutional landscape has changed so significantly since World War II
that a precedent like Quirin, weakened as well by recent revelations of the
questionable circumstances surrounding the decision itself, 67 is more
plausibly classified with those decisions like Korematsu, whose force as
precedent has been diminished by subsequent events, rather than with those
whose undiminished momentum counsels maintenance under principles of
stare decisis (like Roe v. Wade).1
68
In short, congressional involvement is essential not only to supply the
rationale, if one exists, for according aliens less protection in this context
than similarly situated citizens, but also to ameliorate by statute the Order's
procedural inequities and curtailment of rights that otherwise lack an
adequate rationale. Most crucially, legislation can supply constitutionally
indispensable safeguards, such as appeal to an entity independent of the
executive, that the executive branch is inherently incapable of creating and
supervising on its own. Perhaps the most basic such safeguard concerns the
writ of habeas corpus.
3. Habeas Corpus
The need for effective habeas corpus review should independently drive
Congress to act even if political inertia would otherwise lead it to remain
inactive. The Bush Administration has argued that, despite its textual
prohibition of any judicial relief whatsoever, the Order does not mean what
it says, so that habeas petitions may be considered (although the
administration would limit such petitions to challenges to a tribunal's
165. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (requiring a hearing prior to the termination of
welfare benefits).
166. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-68 (1966); see also Dickerson v. United States,
530 U.S. 428 (2000) (reaffirming Miranda).
167. See supra notes 80-82, 117-118, and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 119-122 and accompanying text (discussing the circumstances in which
statutory precedents have been overruled in light of subsequent constitutional developments).
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jurisdiction, in cases where persons are detained or tried domestically).
9
Congress will need to establish fair procedures for habeas review and to
vest lower courts with jurisdiction to hear these cases.
If habeas corpus review is to have any independently protective bite at
all, Article IlI courts will somehow have to police the line between lawful
and unlawful belligerents. But doing so will prove to be exceedingly
difficult, both substantively and procedurally. Substantively, a broad
definition will sweep in persons who have done nothing more than voice
political support for al Qaeda; a narrow one might exclude those likely to
engage in future acts of terrorism. In the end, courts will be called upon to
posit some meta-rule assuring, at the very least, that not every imaginable
individual-including each United States citizen-will be triable militarily
merely upon the unilateral assertion of our Chief Executive that he has
reason to believe the individual is part of an ongoing, and perhaps never-
ending, war crime.
This substantive difficulty is exacerbated by the fact that noncitizens
can protect their right to a civilian trial (and the right to be free of detention
pending trial by military tribunal) only by disproving the merits of the
underlying allegation of criminal activity.
7 More remarkable still, because
the present circumstance involves an entirely protean and amorphous
organization or set of organizations whose membership and, indeed, whose
very existence may be impossible to define fully without reference to the
specific terrorist acts they are accused of plotting or carrying out-witness
the very terms of Congress's Resolution authorizing the use of force-the
attempt to address the issue of military jurisdiction ex ante, and in a
relatively antiseptic way distinct from the proceedings on the merits, may
fail altogether. 7'
Procedurally, civilian courts will have to decide these habeas cases on
the basis of information most of which is likely to be classified and highly
sensitive, so that many of the problems that have been invoked to explain
the need for the Order in the first place-such as the risk of releasing
classified information in open court-may come back to haunt us in habeas
proceedings. Although Congress has passed legislation permitting the
closure of civilian criminal trials when classified evidence is at issue, it has
never extended such laws to the habeas context.
72 It was thus no accident
169. See supra note 12.
170. See supra text accompanying note 101 (discussing how the Order fuses the jurisdictional
question of unlawful belligerency with the underlying substantive offense).
171. Such failure seems particularly likely because the Military Order includes not only
members of such organizations, but also all those who assist them (perhaps even unwittingly).
172. The Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA), to name the primary piece of
relevant legislation, applies only to criminal trials. For example, the "notice by defendant"
provision of CIPA covers "the disclosure of classified information in any manner in connection
with any trial or pretrial proceeding involving the criminal prosecution of such defendant" -
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that Congress, in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, specifically established a "terrorist removal" court, armed with the
special power to remove terrorist aliens from the United States on the basis
of classified evidence.'73 The absence of congressional authorization for the
Order's military tribunals thus perversely winds up harming the
administration's purported goal: to permit individuals to be brought to
justice without disclosure of sources and methods in open court.
Moreover, without appropriate legislation, many habeas corpus
petitions would face hurdles so substantial that, without close congressional
attention, habeas review would provide little beyond a fig leaf.'74 Under
current law, writs of habeas corpus can be "granted by the Supreme Court,
any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their
respective jurisdictions." 171 While this rule is not rigidly applied,"' it may
prevent a defendant from bringing a habeas claim in any district court, as it
notably excluding postconviction proceedings. 18 U.S.C. app. § 5(a) (1994) (emphasis added); see
also id. § 3 ("Upon motion of the United States, the court shall issue an order to protect against
the disclosure of any classified information disclosed by the United States to any defendant in any
criminal case in a district court of the United States." (emphasis added)); id. § 2 ("At any time
after thefiling of the indictment or information, any party may move for a pretrial conference to
consider matters relating to classified information that may arise in connection with the
prosecution." (emphasis added)).
173. See 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(3)(A) (Supp. V 1999); see also TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT,
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-518, at 116 (1996) (emphasizing the need to protect classified sources
in deportation proceedings).
174. Johnson v. Eisentrager could be read to indicate that at least some individuals abroad do
not have any right to habeas:
We are cited to no instance where a court, in this or any other country where the writ is
known, has issued it on behalf of an alien enemy who, at no relevant time and in no
stage of his captivity, has been within its territorial jurisdiction. Nothing in the text of
the Constitution extends such a right, nor does anything in our statutes.
339 U.S. 763, 768 (1950). Of course, if Johnson precludes habeas actions for all those detained
overseas, then the overall threat posed to civil liberties is that much greater. But the Johnson
decision probably does not extend quite so far. The opinion is unclear about which of two
rationales justified its holding that no habeas review was permissible: (I) that the petitioners were
enemies in a declared war, or (2) that they were imprisoned outside the United States on the basis
of conduct committed outside the United States. The Court mentioned both factors and did not get
into the tricky business of which was doing the work. E.g., id. at 777-78 (mentioning both factors
repeatedly). Obviously, the Court was deeply influenced by the language and structure of the 1798
Alien Enemy Act, which stripped alien enemies of nearly all judicial review; that Act is not
applicable on the facts here. In favor of the narrower interpretation, the majority in Johnson
conceded that those claiming citizenship were entitled to a writ of habeas corpus to "assure fair
hearing of [their] claims to citizenship." Id. at 769. If person A is entitled to habeas to decide
whether she is a citizen (because being a citizen is presumably so jurisdictionally important), why
shouldn't person B get a habeas hearing to decide whether she is an enemy belligerent (since that
status is of obvious jurisdictional importance, too)?
175. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
176. Compare Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948) (holding that the District Court for the
District of Columbia cannot issue the writ for those detained on Ellis Island because Ellis Island is
outside of the court's jurisdiction), with Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 495-
98 (1973) (breaking away from earlier precedent such as that established by Ahrens). In Burns v.
Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953), the Court permitted the district court in Washington, D.C., to hear a
habeas petition filed by United States citizens found guilty of rape and murder in Guam, a
territory under supervision of the United States Navy.
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is not clear which district court would be an appropriate venue when the
petitioner's custodian is outside the territorial United States and when the
petitioner's "body" is outside the country as well. Yet giving the defendant
the capacity to bring suit in any district court could lead to damaging
forum-shopping. Indeed, the precursor to the present habeas statute
included the phrase "within their respective jurisdictions" precisely to
avoid such shopping.177 However, there are cases suggesting that, despite
these concerns, jurisdiction may lie in lower courts to hear habeas petitions
from citizens who are abroad. 7 The language of the Military Order cannot
by itself restrict habeas review, given the "longstanding rule requiring a
clear statement of congressional intent to repeal habeas jurisdiction." 17 In
any event, legislation expressly providing that lower courts may entertain
habeas corpus petitions from those detained abroad would clarify the issue
considerably while affording additional safeguards against abuse.
Such safeguards are needed especially because jurisdictional problems
will likely prevent the Supreme Court from hearing habeas corpus petitions
if they are not first filed in lower courts.
18 ° And even if some creative way
to surmount those jurisdictional problems can be found, Supreme Court
Rules say that "[t]o justify the granting of a writ of habeas corpus, the
petitioner must show that exceptional circumstances warrant the exercise of
the Court's discretionary powers." 181 In many post-World War I1 cases, the
Supreme Court rejected leave to file petitions for 
such original writs.
182
177. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 730 (1867) (statement of Sen. Johnson) (stating that
the phrase was necessary to avoid letting " [a]ny man who may be imprisoned in any part of the
United States" seek a "writ issued by a district judge of the United States farthest from the place
of imprisonment"). In addition, the precursor statute also rejected an early proposal to exempt
those in military custody from access to writs of habeas corpus. See Charles Fairman, Some New
Problems of the Constitution Following the Flag, 1 STAN. L. REv. 587, 635-37 (1949) (describing
the history).
178. Ex parte Hayes, 414 U.S. 1327, 1327 (Douglas, Circuit Justice 1973) (permitting a
United States Army private to file a habeas corpus petition in District Court for the District of
Columbia, despite the fact that the "applicant and his commanding officer [were] located in
Germany, outside the territorial jurisdiction of any district court"); Kinnell v. Warner, 356 F.
Supp. 779 (D. Haw. 1973) (applying Hayes to permit a United States Navy officer in the South
China Sea to file a habeas petition in the District Court for the District of Hawaii).
179. INS v. St. Cyr, 121 S. Ct. 2271, 2278 (2001).
180. While Marbury v. Madison famously limited the Court's original jurisdiction to the few
categories enumerated in Article III, Section 2, the Court shortly thereafter decided Ex parte
Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807), holding that a writ of habeas corpus was to be treated as an
instance of the Court's appellate jurisdiction in that it sought correction of the decision of a circuit
court. But Bollman and its progeny have not been read to confer jurisdiction on the Supreme
Court to hear habeas petitions challenging the decisions of military tribunals when the petitions
have not first been ruled upon by an inferior court. See infra note 182.
181. SUP. CT. R. 20.4(a). In earlier times, the Court believed that "it is not only within the
authority of the Supreme Court, but it is its duty to inquire into the cause of commitment ... ,and
if found to be as charged, a matter of which such a court had no jurisdiction, to discharge a
prisoner from confinement." Exparte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 653 (1884).
182. See Everett v. Truman, 334 U.S. 824 (1948) (denying leave to file a motion seeking an
original writ for relief from sentences imposed by the Military Government Court at Dachau on
the basis of an evenly divided Court); Milch v. United States, 332 U.S. 789 (1947) (denying leave
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These decisions were rendered in spite of the fact that, in some of the cases,
there was cause for grave concern about the integrity of the proceedings.
Consider Everett v. Truman,"8 3 where seventy-four Germans on trial at
Dachau sought relief because unbeknownst to them, the prosecutors had
been conducting mock trials with them, complete with fake judges,
prosecutors, and defense counsel. Fake witnesses provided evidence against
the prisoners in order to get them to write confessions. The prisoners were
brought to the "courtroom" covered with black hoods, and the "room
where these proceedings was held contained a table covered with a black
cloth on which stood a crucifix and burning candles." 84 Nevertheless, the
Court dismissed the case.185
In the end, even if courts hear habeas cases, without suitably sculpted
legislation the prospect of habeas review could require the disclosure of
intelligence information in such proceedings-a prospect that could lead
courts to water habeas review down to nothing more than a hollow
formality.
III. CONCLUSION
President Bush has claimed the power to create and operate a system
for adjudicating guilt and dispensing justice through military tribunals
without explicit congressional authorization-threatening to establish a
precedent that future presidents may seek to invoke to circumvent the need
for legislative involvement in other unilaterally defined emergencies. It is
our hope that Congress will avert that danger through appropriate
legislation. But President Bush's constitutional claims will remain even if
Congress acts. While those claims deserve careful and respectful
to file a motion seeking an original writ by an evenly divided Court); Ex parte Betz, 329 U.S. 672,
672 (1946) (denying leave to file "for want of original jurisdiction" over the dissent of Justice
Murphy and the view of Justices Black and Rutledge that the Court should deny leave to file
without prejudice to the filing of the petitions "in the appropriate District Court"). These cases
were apparently decided on the view that it takes five votes to grant such leave, not four as it does
for certiorari.
In In re Yamashita, by contrast, both an appeal from the Philippine Supreme Court and an
original writ of habeas corpus were filed, and the United States Supreme Court did not clearly
indicate which petition provided its jurisdiction. See 327 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1946); see also In re
Yamashita, 326 U.S. 693 (1945) (deferring consideration on the original petition until the petition
for certiorari was received). In Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197 (1948), the Court denied
several Japanese nationals, including former Premier Hirota, leave to file a petition for an original
writ, but it did so on the ground that the convicting body was "not a tribunal of the United
States," but rather one "'of the Allied Powers." Id. at 197.
183. 334 U.S. 824.
184. Press Release, National Military Establishment (Jan. 6, 1949), quoted in Fairman, supra
note 177, at 598 n.37. This report was written by three military officers who went to Germany to
investigate, presided over by Colonel Gordon Simpson, then a justice of the Supreme Court of
Texas. See Fairman, supra note 177, at 597-98 (discussing the Everett case).
185. Everett, 334 U.S. 824.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
1308 [Vol. I 11: 1259
Military Tribunals
consideration, we believe they do not comport with our Constitution's
structure, designed in large measure to secure individual rights by resisting
the centralization of unchecked power. Even those presidents who tested
the constitutional waters, like Abraham Lincoln and Harry Truman, asked
Congress to ratify their actions and promised obedience to whatever
decision Congress made.'86 The present Military Order lacks this basic
promise.
An executive decree, in today's circumstances, that purports to
authorize the trial of unlawful belligerents in military tribunals for terrorism
in the United States is unconstitutional. In such a trial, the government is
not acting to preserve stability and establish the rule of law in conquered
territory, nor is it maintaining order at home in a declared war. There is,
furthermore, no emergency such that approval by Congress would be
impossible to obtain in the immediate future; rather, Congress has proven
itself capable of responding quickly to a wide array of legislative requests
by the administration. In this context, reading the Commander-in-Chief
Clause to authorize the creation of military tribunals would eviscerate
structural constitutional protections.
A closer question would be presented by military trials outside the
United States in a theatre of war. Even if the Constitution' s guarantees were
deemed inapplicable to such trials despite their close connection to
government planning and direction from within the United States, those
trials would be unprecedented absent either an authorizing statute or a
declaration of war. Before we embark on so legally uncharted a course, we
should strive for the enactment of appropriate legislation-both to help
insulate the resulting convictions from judicial invalidation (or at least
international condemnation) and to provide essential legislative elaboration,
through provisions such as those governing appeals and habeas corpus.
Whether or not Congress enacts such legislation, by extending to all
"persons" within the Constitution's reach such guarantees as equal
protection and due process of law, the Constitution constrains how our
government may conduct itself in bringing terrorists to justice. Those
guarantees, in our view, require at least an assured opportunity to appeal a
186. See Lincoln, supra note 56, at 308-10 (stating that certain measures, such as the
blockade of the South and the increased size of the militia, "whether strictly legal or not, were
ventured upon, under what appeared to be a popular demand, and a public necessity; trusting then,
as now, that Congress would readily ratify them" and that it was "believed that nothing has been
done beyond the constitutional competency of Congress" and that the suspension of habeas "is
submitted entirely to the better judgment of Congress"); MAEVA MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE
STEEL SEIZURE CASE 95 (1977) (stating that President Truman's message "seemed designed to
show respect for Congress' prerogative to pass legislation" ). Acceding to Lincoln's request, the
1861 Congress passed a statute stating that it "hereby approve[d] and in all respects legalize[d]
and ma[d]e valid" the previous unilateral acts done by the President "as if they had been issued
and done under the previous express authority and direction of the Congress of the United States."
Act of Aug. 6, 1861, ch. 63, 12 Stat. 326, 326.
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conviction to an authority independent of the prosecuting military power, as
well as meaningful access to habeas review. These constitutional principles,
in conjunction with the provisions for a divided government, are our
security, and to assert them here is to win at home the war we are waging so
effectively abroad. Terrorists have attacked the Federal Building in
Oklahoma and the Pentagon and have toppled the towers of the World
Trade Center, massacring thousands of innocent civilians in the process.
We must not allow them to tear down as well the structure of government,
constituted by the separation of powers, that makes our legal and political
system-and the liberties it embodies and protects-unique. Thomas
Paine's great words are those to live by: "'He that would make his own
liberty secure must guard even his enemy from oppression; for if he violates
this duty he establishes a precedent that will reach to himself."' 187
187. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 81 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (quoting Thomas Paine,
Dissertation on First Principles of Government (July 1795), in 2 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS PAINE 570, 588 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1945)). Justice Murphy stated:
At a time like this when emotions are understandably high it is difficult to adopt a
dispassionate attitude toward a case of this nature. Yet now is precisely the time when
that attitude is most essential. While peoples in other lands may not share our beliefs as
to due process and the dignity of the individual, we are not free to give effect to our
emotions in reckless disregard of the rights of others. We live under the Constitution,
which is the embodiment of all the high hopes and aspirations of the new world. And it
is applicable in both war and peace. We must act accordingly. Indeed, an uncurbed
spirit of revenge and retribution, masked in formal legal procedure for purposes of
dealing with a fallen enemy commander, can do more lasting harm than all of the
atrocities giving rise to that spirit.
Id. at 40-41 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
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